Gorilla’s Guides

BAGHDAD / Aswat al-Iraq: Assa’ad and Omran are almost the same age of eighteen. They share a cell at the Juveniles’ prison in Baghdad, away from their families that live in Dawrah, south of the capital. Both boys joined armed groups and participated in bloody acts of violence in 2006. What distinguishes them is that they are members in opposing groups that kill based on identity.

Prison may be the best destiny for the two boys. Hundreds of their peers were killed in battles or were blown to pieces in suicide bombings for which they were recruited by armed organizations.

Asa’ad Husam Eddin prefers to stay in jail so that he does not become subject to a tribal judgment that condemns him to death for participating in four members of one family. During his childhood, Asa’ad was known by the name “Al-‘Allas”, a term in Iraqi dialect describing children recruited as informers for armed groups. Among his duties was to select a target and monitors its movements so that the armed group could abduct and execute him.

According to his confessions, Asa’ad was active in monitoring people in his neighborhood, and informing Al-Qa’eda elements about their moves, in return for $200 per person.

Omran Abbas has a similar record, except that he used to work for the opposing group. He is spending a sentence of 15 years in jail after being convicted of committing acts of violence in Abu Dsheir area, one street from Al-Daourah. Residents of the two areas belong to two different confessions. Abbas was fourteen when he joined armed groups opposing Al-Qa’eda. He participated in acts of violence during the peak of confessional violence in 2006. Shortly before that, his father was kidnapped by Al-Qa’eda, and was later found beheaded in the ‘no-man’s-land” separating the two “fighting” areas.

As an act of revenge for a lost relative, or to follow in someone’s footsteps, many boys whom we met at the Juvenile Prison, such as Nathem Jabbar, Mahdi Hassan and Sa’doun, and hundreds of others, fell victim to the phenomenon of recruiting children by armed groups that emerged after the battles of the spring and summer of 2004 in Al-Fallujah and Al-Najaf.

A number of armed groups emerged in Iraq after those brutal battles, and spread between Sunni and Shi’ite affiliations. Most of these organizations, however, participated in battles over time, but the major part ended after the spring of 2008.
The most dangerous organization, which continued practicing violence with a steady methodology, was Al-Qa’eda that concentrated its operations after 2003 in Al-Anbar region. It then managed to control a number of cities and governorates such as Salaheddin, Ninewa, South Kirkuk, South Baghdad and North Babel.

The phenomenon of recruiting children by Al-Qa’eda developed form training them in monitoring, collection of information and transferring messages among combatants, to planting explosive devices and participating in killings, to carrying out suicide bombings, in the peak of sectarian violence between 2006 and 2007.

Suicide, Revenge and Kidnap

Before that, recruiting children in suicide bombings was rare and rather erratic. The first operation was carried out by a child of ten years in the fall of 2005, targeting the chief of Kirkuk police (250 kilometers north of Baghdad). After about two months, two children carried out two suicide bombings against the American forces in Al-Fallujah, Al-Anbar province (110 kilometers northwest of the capital, and Al-Huwijeh of the Kirkuk governorate. In the summer of 2008, a child of ten years, disguised as a peddler, followed one of the most prominent leaders of Al-Sahwah in Tarmiyyeh area, Sheikh Emad Jassem, for three consecutive days, after which he succeeded in detonating himself near the Sheikh, whose leg was amputated as a result of the explosion. In the same year, a girl of thirteen carried out a suicide bombing in Ba’quba, the central city of Deyala governorate (57 kilometers east of Baghdad) resulting in the death of a number of Al-Sahwah followers.

The military leader who investigated that operation, as well as a number of child suicide bombings in Deyala, points out that most operations carried out by children are “revengeful” in nature and mostly take place in areas where Al-Qa’eda influence has subsided in favor of Al-Sahwah.

The Media official in Al-Anbar police headquarters, however, sees that “some suicide bombings were not vengeful in nature. The last of these operations were carried out by two children, one of whom had been sedated and the other was mentally unstable.”  The two children were fit with explosive belts and sent to checkpoints. However, a mistake in the timing of the explosive belts enabled the security forces to dismantle them, according to the media official. He further explains that “fitting explosive belts around children’s bodies is a tactic used by Al-Qa’eda over the past years.”  Another method used was to send closed explosive packages by hand with children, and to detonate them from a distance the minute the children are in close proximity to security forces or when they board civilian cars or arrive in markets.”

The father of the mentally deranged suicide bomber child says that his son Ghazi was kidnapped from in front of the family house in Al-Khaldiyyah area of Al-Anbar, a former stronghold of Al-Qa’eda. His fate was unknown until he was found near the checkpoint with an explosive belt around his waist. Ghazi’s father is now very worried because his younger son was also kidnapped at the beginning of last October, and might be used in the same manner unless he pays the ransom the kidnappers demand.

Dirgham, a mongoloid child was booby-trapped by elements from Al-Qa’eda after he was tempted to buy sweets from a shop near a security center where elements from the police force shop during their break. The child was killed, and with him a number of policemen and shoppers. Despite this, the child’s father refuses to criticize Al-Qa’eda in fear that they might return one day.

Fathers Fear Children

Fear from Al-Qa’eda’s revenge is not restricted to Dirgham’s father, but extends to many people with whom this report-writer talked. They refrained from telling their experiences with the process their children were recruited.

A high-ranking officer from Al-Anbar says that sleeping Al-Qa’eda cells become active during certain periods, then go back to sleep, which indicates that risking the exposure of details may not be liked by the organization, and may mean paying with lives. This officer tells the story of three children who burnt their father to death.  The father was a moderate religious man. They placed him between old rubber tires and set them on fire, simply because he criticized Al-Qa’eda.

We asked one of the fathers if he had made any effort to prevent his children from joining Al-Qa’eda. He answered: “I lived for years hesitating to take any step such as this, afraid that they may kill me if I went too far.”Although the son left Iraq to a neighboring country after the defeats Al-Qa’eda received, the father continues to be careful that the son may one day return.

Faris Al-Obeidi summarizes children’s motives in joining armed groups in two words: “poverty” and “revenge.”

An official in research at the Juveniles’ Prison, however, believes that “unemployment and family disintegration” are the main reasons, in addition to some sort of “ideological thought” that prevails at home, as the first incubator that attracts children to the circle of violence. Iraq is “eligible for its children to pursue violence, because it lived for decades in a state of conflict and continuous wars.”

Fawwaz Ibrahim, the social researcher relates this phenomenon to the period preceding 2003; the date of the American invasion of Baghdad. Years before that date, “children, named ‘Saddam’s Cubs’ participated in operations of killing and cutting hands and tongues in many areas. Militarization of children was part of the militarization of society which the last century witnessed.”  At that time, “Al-Tala’e organization, which was part of the Ba’ath party used to recruit children in groups affiliated with the authority, to monitor the neighbor, street, the school and even the home, reporting periodically about anybody suspected of opposing the regime.”

The researcher connects between the practices of the followers of Al-Tala’e and the specialty of most recruited children in reporting to armed organizations about all details going on in their vicinity.

He is joined in this rhetoric the researcher Al-Obaidi: “For a person to be a hero in an ideological army is something like a dream that children have when living in a society dominated by violence.”  Hence, Al-Obaidi sees that “recruitment will not be difficult in a society where children boast about flaunting their power, that starts with carrying plastic toy weapons and forming groups to launch imaginary attacks from one street to another, declaring allegiance to armed groups that have a strong grip on areas, attending their events and military parades.”

Going Along with the Party in Power

Ali Al-Massoudi, the activist specializing in armed groups’ thought has documented a number of the features of children joining armed groups. He sees that recruitment depends basically on “the recruited child’s environment”. In most cases, the child gets carried away with the prevailing beliefs prevailing in his home, street and neighborhood where he lives. Al-Massoudi divides this phenomenon into four levels: Information collection or monitoring (less than ten years), carrying firearms, participating in guard duties and checkpoints (13 – 18 years) and getting involved in violent operations such as kidnapping, killing and participating in street fights (15 – 18 years). The more dangerous level, according to Al-Massoudi, is carrying out suicide operations, normally connected to Al-Qa’eda organization.

The first level prevails in “areas that are closed ideologically, especially during the period of confessional violence when armed groups enjoyed the sympathy of the area residents.”  Children grouping t crossroads were active in informing armed men about the arrival of American troops, preparing to detonate explosives near them.

One specialist at the Ministry of Interior says that recruiting children is not restricted to one armed group and not the other, “despite variation in the level of their concentration.”  This specialist saw for himself large numbers of children carrying arms at the “Jund El-Sama’a (Soldiers of Heaven) camp in the Zarka area, 13 kilometers north east of the holy city of Al-Najaf, holy to Shi’ite Muslims (160 kilometers south of Baghdad), during confrontations that took place between them and Iraqi forces in early 2007. But he believes that the more dangerous organization for children is Al-Qa’eda, which established organizations specializing in enticing children under soft names like “birds of heaven, youth of heaven and cubs of heaven.”

The expert mentioned that the “Birds of Heaven” organization, which was active in Al-Anbar and Deyala when Al-Qa’eda controlled them was for the “children of the leadership and elements of Al-Qa’eda in Iraq.”  The Cubs and Children of heaven organizations were used to “lure children with certain specifications that qualify them to indulge in battles and carry out suicide bombings.”

Camps for Brainwashing

After a raid in November of 2006 on a ‘hideout’ for Al-Qa’eda north of Baghdad, the American forces discovered an electronic storage device that had information on children’s sleeping cells, in addition to details regarding recruiting them and training them for armed operations.

The Director of Operations at the Ministry of Interior Colonel Abdul Kareem Khalaf asserts that Al-Qa’eda organization is “the major party that depended on child recruitment from poor families, and those who were subjected to intellectual changes towards extremism through religious training courses organized in mosques without censorship.”

The most important areas where Al-Qa’eda trained children on armed operations is Al-Mukhaiseh remote area, which falls within the Humrain hills band in Deyala governorate, according to Colonel Khalaf. “Hundreds of children from both genders were exposed to brainwashing and continuous training under the supervision of experts from Al-Qa’eda, some of whom arrived from outside Iraq for this purpose.”

According to Colonel Khalaf, recruitment did not target poor families and those transformed to extremism only. There were remnants from those who were known as Saddam’s Cubs. These form a large group that entered continuous training camps until 2003.

The most dangerous children who were involved in armed operations and the most vicious were the children and brothers of activists in Al-Qa’eda. All these, according to Colonel Khalaf, were trained in areas with winding roads and orchards with thick trees and vegetation that are difficult to access, in addition to the remote areas extending deep into the desert.

Child training camps spread in areas under the control of Al-Qa’eda for years. There are camps in Deyala, Al-Anbar and Al-Mada’en south of Baghdad, in addition to border areas adjacent to Syria in the west and Iran in the east.

A New Generation of Al-Qa’eda

One of the former Al-Qa’eda theorists told the report writer at a detention center run by the Ministry of Interior that recruiting children “is carried out

A New Generation of Al-Qa’eda

One of Al-Qa’eda’s former theoreticians tells the report writer from his Interior Ministry prison cell that the recruitment of children is “done under the direct supervision of Al-Qa’eda leaderships.”  The first step begins by “encouraging the children to take Quran memorization classes,” especially those who have specific characteristics, such a good build and excessive obedience.  Hikmat adds:  “We take into consideration the family they belong to, whether it is known for radicalism or not.  Then we join them to groups older of age to nourish them intellectually in preparation for giving them assignments, like moving cash and publications for the organization’s members.”  After that, “they are assigned to transport explosive devices and sometimes planting them in certain areas, then we put them in armed operations that sometimes require them to engage in direct confrontations.”

One of the dissents of Al-Qa’eda gives an expanded description of the stages of building the children’s networks by specialists in Al-Qa’eda who succeeded in brainwashing the brains of a large number of children whose fathers or brothers had been killed.  Abul Waleed is a nickname that a man in his late forties gave himself who previously worked with Al-Qa’eda, then moved to Al-Sahwah forces before he ultimately abandoned both and secluded himself in a house he rented in a area on the outreaches of southern Baghdad.  Abul Waleed says:  “The first cells specializing in child recruitment launched after the battles of 2004 south of the capital city and included nearly 100 children who were carefully selected to ensure that they fulfill dangerous duties, foremost suicide bombings.”

Abul Waleed summarizes Al-Qa’eda’s strategy for recruiting this youth by saying that children are registered in religious classes that focus on “Quranic verses and sayings by the Prophet that encourage fighting the enemies, the infidels and the renegades.”  After that, says Abul Waleed, they are shown videos of suicide operations previously executed by the organization’s members in Iraq and Afghanistan against foreign forces.  Experts seek to convince the youth that they can do this to preserve the faith and that they will be heroes of Islam and remembered by future generations.  This thought in particular “was the obsession that the experts use to influence the thoughts of most of the youth and ensures that the spirit of bravery and courage is raised within them.”

The majority of those selected for the child recruitment cells, Abul Waleed discloses, are the offspring of Al-Qa’eda members or who known for their hard-line tendencies at an early age.  Some “begin the recruitment stage with enthusiasm but soon try to backtrack, and therefore Al-Qa’eda is forced to make them continue by threatening to tell their parents or the authorities about their participation in the training or threaten to kill them or liquidate their families if they change their minds.”

The most dangerous, says Abul Waleed, are “those that have lost their parents at the hands of the American or Iraqi forces or even as a result of internal strife.”  These “do not need much effort to be encouraged to execute combat and even suicide operations.  It is enough to concentrate on the idea that they will be avenging their murdered family if they execute suicide operations.”

Child recruitment serves four purposes:

• Ensuring that there are new combatant generation that expand the presence of the organization, increase its power and assault and make up for the deficit of combatants, which the organization suffered from after losing the areas near Syria to Al-Sahwah forces and the security forces.
• Taking advantage of children’s easy movement and that the security authorities do not pay attention to them or doubt them when they cross check points.
• Maintaining the momentum of suicide operations that kill more people and give the organization attention in the media, thus increasing the terror it spreads.
• Bring in more combatants by promoting the idea that children are braver than men who failed to join Al-Qa’eda to fight for the sake of God.

Abul Waleed states here that the leader of Al-Qa’eda in Iraq, Abu Mos’ab Al-Zarqawi, who was killed in American air raid in mid 2006, addressed an audio message chastising the men who did not join the organization after a woman executed a suicide operation in Deyala (see link 2).

The Young Instead of the Old

A high level security source in Al-Anbar province adds a fifth reason that he says he had seen up close and personal.  The majority of children’s suicide attacks were directed at Al-Sahwah men, which means that Al-Qa’eda wanted to terrorize the Al-Sahwah men and tell them they are “killed at the hands of their children.”

Researcher Faris Al-Obeidi confirms what Abul Waleed says and adds that Al-Qa’eda did not keep the recruitment of children secret, but rather promoted them and featured trainings on websites and YouTube.

Al-Obeidi refers to a videotape of children between 10-12 years of age wearing black clothes and covering their faces with masks as Al-Qa’eda members do, and training on weapons, make-belief kidnapping, breaking into a house after climbing its walls.  The videotape was shown extensively (see link 3) after Al-Qa’eda lost much of its popularity in its home environment, believes Al-Obeidi, and after the process of recruiting local combatants became difficult and bringing in foreign combatants even more difficult because of the control of the Iraqi forces on most of the border line with Syria.

The sheikh and speaker of one of the mosques in the city of Ramadi in the center of Al-Anbar province pointed to a “jurisprudence dispute about the dividing line between childhood and manhood”, and believed that “this dispute helped Al-Qa’eda penetrate into the minds of targeted people and facilitated the consideration of children’s recruitment as a legitimate matter.”

The sheikh, who is considered one of the leading moderate men of religion in Al-Ramadi city, reminded that Islam “banned the use of children and women in the execution of any acts that anger God and their recruitment for the purpose of executing suicide actions that lead to the killing of innocent people, whether civilians or even policemen, and it is prohibited.”

While religious scholars agree that Jihad is a duty of every Muslim, but it is “within conditions specified in the Islamic Sharia Law, most important of which that it must be based on wrong jurisprudence, such as rendering another an apostate or deciding that he has violated religion because he disagreed on jurisprudence issues, as Al-Qa’eda does and which has rendered everyone an apostate, including the followers of the Sunni sects that do not support it.”

The sheikh expresses regret that hard-line ideas calling for killing are spreading mostly in the rigid tribal communities, where the level of education is low and the culture of violence is prolific, unlike the moderate environment that is considered strongholds for moderate men of religion who cannot guarantee the security of their lives if they propose their ideas outside of this environment.

The word “Jihad” captivated the young boy, Yaser Thanoun, and encouraged him to work with Al-Qa’eda.  His elder brother was killed in Al-Fallujah battles in 2004.  Yaser completely believes that resisting the occupation is a duty for every Muslim, and says:  “I did not join Al-Qa’eda in search of money, as some of my friends have.”  He settled for an income of 70,000 to 100,000 Dinars (around $80) to cover his expenses after blowing up every explosive or carrying out a combat operation against the government forces.  After the death of his combatant brother, Yaser had to join the organization on a full time basis and left his work as a smith that was providing for his family.  “The money was not my objective, but rather the Jihad against the occupiers,” says Yaser, who was captured after he engaged in battle against Iraqi police personnel in Fallujah in 2008.

The situation is different for Nuseir.  His belief in the necessity of Jihad was not the thing that pushed him to join the armed groups.  His friends were the ones that convinced him to take part in the armed operations with them under the command of Al-Qa’eda.

Nuseir’s father spoke proudly with a tone of sadness of his son.  After Nuseir trained to use weapons and launch rockets, his father says, “he participated in the bombing of American forces in Al-Mazra’a area in the east of Fallujah, then the joint check point at the city’s entrance.”  After that, Nuseir joined the armed factions in battle in the city, and was arrested in 2007 and was transported to Boca prison.  He remained in prison for one year and a half until he was released under the general pardon.  He was soon killed by an unknown group when he was walking in the city.

The bereaved father refuses to talk about his son’s movements after he got out of prison.  Yet he confirms that “he received threats from groups that the opponents of the group he belonged to,” in an indication that he was back with his initial group.

The mourning father criticizes “the government for releasing so many of the prisoners before they were able to reform them and convince them to abandon the violence.”  He demands the government to monitor “the mosques which have become in their majority lairs that attract the youth.”

The responsibility of the family

Senior Secretary General of the Interior Ministry, Adnan Al-Asadi, however, accuses the children’s families of being the first to bring harm to them because they left them unobserved.

Al-Asadi says:  “The boys who got involved in armed groups found the easy money and social influence an earning worth the risk by working with Al-Qa’eda members.”  Al-Asadi however believes, and according to the results of investigations with a large number of the “Birds of Heaven” children and “the boys of heaven”, that the number of suicide operations executed by children is “small” compared to other types of operations such as “monitoring and logistical support for the militants.”

The idea of killing, believes Al-Asadi, “is no longer receiving response from the children, especially after the decline of the influence of Al-Qa’eda’s and the armed groups that have lost their strongholds in Al-Anbar, Deyala, Salaheddin, Ninawa and areas south of Baghdad.”

Researcher Faris Al-Obeidi believes that rehabilitating hundreds of children who engaged in militant work requires “a great deal of social and government effort and this is difficult to achieve in view of the economic, security and political instability in Iraq.”

In the final outcome, these are part of a mobile social system, and if they do not have a sound environment to help them integrate in their societies, “they will definitely go back to the armed groups that had provided them with a sense of belonging.”

Juvenile rehabilitation plans currently adopted are not convincing to the prison director, who complains that the building cannot accommodate “the large number of juveniles, given that the current building is a temporary alternative for the original prison that was overtaken by refugees refusing so far to leave it despite all official attempts.”

The juvenile prison building is similar to an elementary school.  It is nothing more than a yard surrounded by four prison cells and a few small rooms for the guards, as well as a caravan for the prison director to do his job.

The research unit chief in prison that the lack of entertainment facilities and training workshops have not helped the prison staff to lower the number of medical cases that usually accompany imprisonment, such as the depression that many prisoners suffer from because they feel neglected by their own families.

The research chief believes that terrorism prisoners are inherently “good” people, but have been exploited and taken advantage of because of their difficult life conditions.

A field study by a researcher in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs indicates that family disintegration is responsible for half of the reasons that lead children’s integration in registered organizations.

Field study shows the reasons behind children joining armed groups.

“Family disintegration was the cause that led to the recruitment of 47% of child prisoners into armed groups.”  The researcher attributes this to their residing outside the family home with relatives or friends or in workplaces.  The study found that 63% of those convicted of terrorism have engaged in armed work under influence of friends.

The study, which was based on a sample of 80 prisoners convicted of terrorism according to Article 4, indicates that murder represents 56% of the types of crimes committed by children, while 18% of the sample planted and exploded explosive devices, and 15% executed kidnappings.

The low educational level was prevalent among the sample.  Half of them did not pass elementary education, and 55% of the sample justified their engagement in armed operation with their belief in the resistance.  Meanwhile, political convictions and affiliations were the cause of 28% joining the armed groups.

More than half of the children convicted of terrorism according to Article 4 and are imprisoned in the juvenile prison were sentence to more than ten years.  These are “major” sentences, believes the researcher who criticizes the fact the judges rely on Law number 111 for 1996, which places terrorism crimes under the definition of crimes, stipulating sentences to be five or more years.

Indications however show that the rate of children’s engagement in armed groups receded a great deal in the past two years because of improving security conditions in many areas that were previously considered “hot zones.”

This improvement, according to researcher Faris Al-Obeidi, “led to economic movement in the country, which in turn contributed to the movement of the majority of youth towards profitable professions and abandoning armed organizations where the work has become dangerous with the increase of the power of security forces.  Moreover, the ideas on which the armed groups were based “receded in a major way and do not have a standing except with religious hard-liners.”

Interior Minister Jawad Al-Bolani confirms that Al-Qa’eda’s influence in Iraq was “broken and it has lost control over its old strongholds, which put it in a critical situation that prevents from continuing to recruit children in the manner it has been doing in past years.”  The stage of recruiting children, Al-Bolani says, “is over now, and although there are a few sleeper cells, the intelligence efforts will continue to pursue them and eliminate them in the end, sooner or later.”

Researchers Al-Obeidi, Fawwaz Ibrahim, and Al-Massoudi, along with the research chief at the juvenile prison and the researcher in the Labor Ministry, believe that the receding phenomenon of child recruitment is not the end of the story, and that intelligence efforts, no matter how strong it is, will not be able to eliminate this phenomenon completely.  There is always a chance for it to come back if rehabilitation plans that can fortify children and protect them against extremist thinking, which continues to look for an opportunity to prevail once again in Iraq, are not implemented.

Children indulging in Iraqi violence to the level of suicide : Aswat Al Iraq

LONDON, Oct 20, 2010 (IPS) – The U.S.-led invasion and then occupation of Iraq brought a sharp setback to the rights of women in that country, UNFPA head Thoraya Obaid tells IPS in an interview.

The view that Muslim societies are necessarily backward on the position of women arises from stereotyping, she says. And she speaks of herself as a Muslim woman who does not fit the stereotype.

Obaid spoke to IPS Wednesday at the launch of the annual UNFPA report, focused this year on the role of women in peace building. Excerpts from the interview:

Q: Is there any evidence that women are better than men at peace building and rebuilding?

A: There is evidence that not only in peace building and rebuilding but in other areas as with migrant workers, the priorities for women are usually different. As a result women invest in the family, and during conditions where there is war or natural disaster, you will find that women can even cross borders to be able to keep the family together, and are able to negotiate the safety of their families. So in that context we see that women should be a part of any peace building negotiations.

Q: Women can play that role when they have an opportunity, but is there any sign that women are getting more such opportunities?

A: Sadly, no. Opportunities are still limited because the recognition that women can play that role is still limited. We are saying that if we invest enough in women, in their education, in empowering them to have a voice, to raise their voice, and if we recognise their voices and find space for them to play a role in peace building, then they will do a good job.

Liberia is a very good example of that. It’s women who walk the streets saying we want peace. But society still does not recognise the real value of women, and that is a real problem.

Q: There is a widespread perception that the position of women in Islamic societies is low. But in Iraq women had many rights, that vanished after the Americans came along.

A: I worked in Iraq for eight years until the invasion of Kuwait. We were there as a part of the Economic Commission for Western Asia, and we worked with women’s groups there at that time, and certainly, by the time we left the Federation of Iraqi Women had put together the best family laws you can get from all the different sects, and also labour laws. But then the invasion came and the whole thing went apart.

When the U.S. came in, they went back to the family laws of 1958. That tells you how far they have gone back. What they did was to cancel everything that was previous. And that is not really a good judgment for women. It was quite a bit of difference.

Q: How does this square with the perception that left to themselves, Muslim societies are backward, and that the U.S is the progressive one?

A: That is a political question in many ways. There are stereotypes of Muslim countries, and Muslim women. I’m a Muslim woman, and I don’t fit that stereotype. There are many like me. I come from Saudi Arabia, and see where I am right now. This is the stereotyping of a people and also of a religion, and as a result assumptions are based on such perceptions. In many ways it is perceptions that hinder Muslim women in many places.

Q: Is the U.N. making a difference, or does it just produce reports?

A: Look at the report we are putting out on Security Council resolution 1325. This has brought the issue of women as peace makers and peace builders into a higher level of political awareness. As a result, at least 19 countries are putting into place their own plans on how to bring women to end violence against women in wars, conflict and natural disasters, in camps and so on. These studies are important because they mobilise political leaders and I think that is a very important role for the United Nations.

Q: What does this report say that is significant and new?

A: The new trend we are trying to bring into the discussion about women is the three R’s – Resilience, Renewal, and Redefining roles. Women are always seen as victims. We are saying women are not victims. Women have the resilience, they keep the families together. And with renewal, when we are rebuilding after a crisis, we should not rebuild society as it was before, with all the inequalities and inequities in it, but on a new human rights paradigm that will bring equality.

Q: How can the MDGs targets be met in relation to conflicts?

A: A part of conflicts is poverty, and poverty brings conflict. So MDG 1 on poverty cannot be achieved if there is no peace and security. Each of the MDGs requires peace and security.

And with MDG5 on maternal health, for a long time actors in the humanitarian field did not recognise that women have special needs. In war and natural disasters, they do deliver babies, they do have biological functions that require special attention. There is a need to take care of their integrity and their dignity. So we are looking at MDG 5 because we want women to deliver babies in a clean state, and that they are safe.

More importantly [is] that they are protected from violence – when violence takes place, that they are provided with the services that support them but also that perpetrators of violence are brought to justice. Violence against women is part of the MDG5 target on universal access to reproductive health.

Q&A: What the U.S. Undid for Women in Iraq – IPS ipsnews.net

Iraq tops for unsolved murders of reporters:

The CPJ’s Impunity Index “calculates the number of unsolved journalist murders as a percentage of a country’s population” for the years 2000 through 2009 and ranks them accordingly.

Twelve countries made the list with five or more unsolved cases.

Iraq was number one with 88 unsolved journalist murders, or 2.794 unsolved murders per one million inhabitants.

Read in full:

The Day In Quotes:

1. Hassiba Hadj Sahraoui, Amnesty’s Middle East and North Africa deputy director on the "secret jail" being run by Nouri al-Maliki’s office:

   "The existence of secret jails indicates that military units in Iraq are allowed to commit human rights abuses unchecked,".

   Source:

2. Kamil Amin, spokesman for Iraq’s Human Rights Ministry on the "secret jail" being run by Nouri al-Maliki’s office.
   
   "We found judges and representatives of the public prosecutor installed inside the prison, which means the prison is not a secret one"

   Same source as quote No: 1 above

3. Iyad Allawi on the ruling that Baghdad’s ballots should be recounted:
   
   "The List does not object the judicial authority’s ruling to recount ballots in Baghdad although it does not serve interest of the Iraqi people,"

   Source:

4. Charles Tripp on on Iraq’s political future to David Tresilian:

   "Quite a few of the Iraqis who will come to power are people who are deeply mindful of the role America has played in getting them into power, so the question is will they be able to establish themselves as something other than American puppets, especially if they are competing with others who are saying that they weren’t the ones who were parachuted in on the back of an American invasion."

   Source:

Political Coverage:

Iraqi secular leader says votes recount must be under strict international monitoring | Xinhua

"We respect the latest measures (of appeals panel for manual recount for votes in Baghdad), which must be under international strict monitoring," Allawi told news conference.

However, Allawi warned that such recount should include areas that his bloc submitted complaints about alleged manipulation other than Baghdad, otherwise, his bloc would take decisions which he refused to name.

"If such measures (manual recount) would not cover other areas that we have submitted complaints, the Iraqia bloc would take a decision which I don’t want to disclose now," Allawi said.

Read in full

Vote recount double-bladed sword for Iraq to end political deadlock: by Li Laifang, Jamal Ahmed : Xinhua

BAGHDAD, April 19 (Xinhua) — An Iraqi appeals court in charge of reviewing alleged electoral frauds ordered a manual recount of votes in Baghdad on Monday, raising possibilities of a change in the initial results of the country’s pivotal national poll last month and a delay of government formation.

Iraq’s electoral authorities did not specify the scale of recount in the capital, a key province with the largest share of 70 seats in the new 325-member parliament.

[snip]

In response to fraud allegations, a recount is one of the steps needed to end the political deadlock, as all blocs should accept the final results approved by the country’s Supreme Court.

[snip]

A recount may change the seat ranking of the two leading blocs with just a gap of two seats. And any change in seat numbers is likely to bring about more subsequent political rows.

Thus the bitter fight between Maliki and Allawi will not end soon, as long as both are eyeing the prime minister post and the right to form a coalition government.

[snip]

It may take months for Iraq to have a new government. Allawi has warned that Iraq will see chaos if there is no new government when the U.S. troops in the country are cut down to around 50,000 by the end of August.

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Security Coverage:

كونا : Iraq launches operation " Leap of the Lion " to hunt down  Al-Qaeda – Military and Security – 20/04/2010 -الدفاع والأمن:

Operation "Leap of the Lion" still in motion and will continue to hunt down Al-Qaeda elements in Iraq, said the Iraqi government on Tuesday.

Major General Qassem Atta told KUNA that the campaign aimed at dismantling Al-Qaeda operations, saying that such operations, which began in March 11, succeeded in the arrest of several Al-Qaeda leaders.

In accordance to intelligence information and USF-I backup, the operations lead to the capture and death of several Qaeda operatives such as Abu Suhaib, leader of Al-Qaeda in northern Iraq.

The slain terrorist known as Ahmad Al-Obaidi was in charge terrorist operations in Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salahuddin governorates, but the Iraqi forces managed to end his reign of terror, said Attah.

Source:

كونا : Qaeda leader for northern Baghdad operations killed – الدفاع والأمن – 20/04/2010:

The leader of Al-Qaeda terrorist group for operations in areas north of Baghdad Ahmad Al-Obaidi, known as Abu Suhaib, was killed by US forces, a leading Iraqi military commander told KUNA Tuesday.

The source said the militant was killed in an operation separate from the one which led to the killing of Abu Ayoub Al-Masri and Abu Umar Al-Baghdadi, but would not give more details.

The militant was the group’s official responsible for Ninawa, Kirkuk, and Salahiddeen regions.

The official added the son of Al-Baghdadi and the assistant of Al-Masri was killed in the same operation in which the two leaders were killed. Another 16 aides and militants were also arrested, the source said

Source:

Children of Anti-Qaeda Militia Chief Beheaded in Iraq Asharq Alawsat Newspaper (English):

TARMIYAH, Iraq (AFP) – Five family members of a local chief of an anti-Qaeda militia were gunned down in their homes in Tarmiyah, north of the Iraqi capital on Tuesday, with the children also beheaded, police said.

"The wife, a daughter of 22 and three boys of between 12 and 16 were shot dead, with the assassins also beheading the last three," said Colonel Tawfiq al-Janaabi, police chief of Tarmiyah, 45 kilometres (28 miles) from Baghdad.

He said the local chief of the Al-Sahwa militia, identified as Abu Ali, was on duty at a checkpoint at the time of the attack.

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Senior police officer killed in Iraqi bomb attacks:

Two people, including a senior police officer, were killed and four others wounded on Tuesday in bomb attacks in Baghdad and Iraq’s western province of Anbar, an Interior Ministry source said.

A roadside bomb struck the convoy of Colonel Raheem Omer, deputy police chief of Anbar province’s Hit city, some 160 km west of Baghdad, killing him, his driver and wounding two policemen, the source told Xinhua on condition of anonymity.

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Soldier Charged in Iraq Slayings Back in Court | 13WMAZ.com | Macon, GA:

A Fort Stewart soldier charged with slaying a superior and a fellow U.S. soldier in Iraq is due back in a military court.

A military judge is scheduled Tuesday to hear defense motions in the case of Army Sgt. Joseph Bozicevich. The judge may also rule on requests from both prosecutors and defense lawyers to delay his court-martial on murder charges.

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Economic Coverage:

France24 – China’s CNPC to boost Iraqi oilfield output:

China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC), the country’s top oil producer, aims to boost output at a giant Iraqi oilfield by 10 percent this year, a newspaper owned by the company said Tuesday.

CNPC and Britain’s BP in November signed a deal with Iraq to nearly triple production from the current one million barrels a day to 2.85 million barrels at the Rumaila field over the next six to seven years.

The consortium will fully take over work on the oilfield by June 30 and plans to increase its output by 10 percent by the end of this year, said a report by China Petroleum Daily, a newpaper owned by CNPC.

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Oil services giant set to tap Iraq:

As energy companies scavenge for hard-to-extract sources in oil sands or deep water, Iraq is one of the last, and least exploited, sources of old-style cheap oil. Assuming Iraq can hit the targets set in last year’s round of oil contracts, the nation will be gushing close to an additional 10 million barrels a day by the end of the decade, according to the Energy Policy Research Foundation.

Even getting half the way to this goal — a more realistic assumption –would eclipse other historic surges in supply, such as those from Russia in the mid-2000s and Mexico in the early 1980s. The stingy fee-per-barrel structure of the contracts oil companies have signed in Iraq means they benefit from volume, not price, giving them a powerful incentive to pump at full speed. And all this is before allowing for new finds, which some geologists believe could more than double Iraqi reserves.

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Commentary and Analysis

IRAQ: Imam Assassination Sparks Fears of Violence – By Abdu Rahman and Dahr Jamail – IPS ipsnews.net:

BAGHDAD, Apr 20, 2010 (IPS) – The assassination of Sheikh Ghazi Jabouri, a prominent Sunni Imam in the Al- Adhamiya district of Baghdad, has raised fears of renewed sectarian violence in the wake of the Mar. 7 elections.

Tensions have been reported in the area following the assassination Wednesday last week. At least two gunmen killed Sheikh Jabouri, 42, as he walked home after completing morning prayers at the Rahman Mosque.

His brother Sarmad Faisal Jabouri, like many Iraqis in Adhamiya district, blames the government. "We hold the government fully responsibility for the killing of my brother, because they are supposed to be in control of security at the entrances and exits to the area," Jabouri said.

The attack came on a morning when a high-ranking officer in Iraq’s anti- terrorism police was killed by a bomb planted in his car. The attack also killed two nearby policemen.

The violence comes amidst a wave of increasing attacks across the capital, and amidst political instability in the wake of last month’s elections, that have yet to yield a clear winner.

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BAGHDAD, Mar 12, 2010 (IPS) – Under Saddam Hussein, women in government got a year’s maternity leave; that is now cut to six months. Under the Personal Status Law in force since Jul. 14, 1958, when Iraqis overthrew the British-installed monarchy, Iraqi women had most of the rights that Western women do.

Now they have Article 2 of the Constitution: "Islam is the official religion of the state and is a basic source of legislation." Sub-head A says "No law can be passed that contradicts the undisputed rules of Islam." Under this Article the interpretation of women’s rights is left to religious leaders – and many of them are under Iranian influence.

"The U.S. occupation has decided to let go of women’s rights," Yanar Mohammed who campaigns for women’s rights in Iraq says. "Political Islamic groups have taken southern Iraq, are fully in power there, and are using the financial support of Iran to recruit troops and allies. The financial and political support from Iran is why the Iraqis in the south accept this, not because the Iraqi people want Islamic law."

With the new law has come the new lawlessness. Nora Hamaid, 30, a graduate from Baghdad University, has now given up the career she dreamt of. "I completed my studies before the invaders arrived because there was good security and I could freely go to university," Hamaid tells IPS. Now she says she cannot even move around freely, and worries for her children every day. "I mean every day, from when they depart to when they return from school, for fear of abductions."

There is 25 percent representation for women in parliament, but Sabria says "these women from party lists stand up to defend their party in the parliament, not for women’s rights." For women in Iraq, the invasion is not over.

The situation for Iraq’s women reflects the overall situation: everyone is affected by lack of security and lack of infrastructure.

"The status of women here is linked to the general situation," Maha Sabria, professor of political science at Al-Nahrain University in Baghdad tells IPS. "The violation of women’s rights was part of the violation of the rights of all Iraqis." But, she said, "women bear a double burden under occupation because we have lost a lot of freedom because of it.

"More men are now under the weight of detention, so now women bear the entire burden of the family and are obliged to provide full support to the families and children. At the same time women do not have freedom of movement because of the deteriorated security conditions and because of abductions of women and children by criminal gangs."

Women, she says, are also now under pressure to marry young in family hope that a husband will bring security.

Sabria tells IPS that the abduction of women "did not exist prior to the occupation. We find that women lost their right to learn and their right to a free and normal life, so Iraqi women are struggling with oppression and denial of all their rights, more than ever before."

Yanar Mohammed believes the constitution neither protects women nor ensures their basic rights. She blames the United States for abdicating its responsibility to help develop a pluralistic democracy in Iraq.

"The U.S. occupation has decided to let go of women’s rights," Mohammed told reporters. "Political Islamic groups have taken southern Iraq, are fully in power there, and are using the financial support of Iran to recruit troops and allies. The financial and political support from Iran is why the Iraqis in the south accept this, not because the Iraqi people want Islamic law."

"The real ruler in Iraq now is the rule of old traditions and tribal, backward laws," Sabria says. "The biggest problem is that more women in Iraq are unaware of their rights because of the backwardness and ignorance prevailing in Iraqi society today."

Many women have fled Iraq because their husband was arbitrarily arrested by occupation forces or government security personnel, says Sabria.

More than four million Iraqis were estimated to have been displaced through the occupation, including approximately 2.8 million internally. The rest live as refugees mainly in neighbouring countries, according to a report by Elizabeth Ferris, co-director of the Brookings Institution-University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement.

The report, titled, ‘Going Home? Prospects and Pitfalls For Large-Scale Return Of Iraqis’, says most displaced Iraqi women are reluctant to return home because of continuing uncertainties.

The Washington-based Refugees International (RI) says in a report ‘Iraqi Refugees: Women’s Rights and Security Critical to Returns’ that "Iraqi women will resist returning home, even if conditions improve in Iraq, if there is no focus on securing their rights as women and assuring their personal security and their families’ well-being."

The RI report covered internally displaced women in Iraq’s semi-autonomous northern Kurdish region and female refugees in Syria. "Not one woman interviewed by RI indicated her intention to return," the report says.

"This tent is more comfortable than a palace in Baghdad; my family is safe here," a displaced woman in northern Iraq told RI.

The situation continues to be challenging for women within Iraq.

"I am an employee, and everyday go to my work place, and the biggest challenge for me and all the suffering Iraqis is the roads are closed and you feel you are a person without rights, without respect," a 35-year-old government employee, who asked to be referred to as Iman, told IPS.

"To what extent has this improved my security," she asked. "We have better salaries now, but how can women live with no security? How can we enjoy our rights if there is no safe place to go, for rest and recreation and living?"

(*Abdu, our correspondent in Baghdad, works in close collaboration with Dahr Jamail, our U.S.-based specialist writer on Iraq who reports extensively on the region)

IRAQ: Women Miss Saddam – IPS ipsnews.net

WASHINGTON, Jul 6 (IPS) – The United States largely complied with a plan, negotiated with Iraq’s government last November, to withdraw its troops from the centre of all Iraqi cities by Jun. 30.

But the late June announcement that Vice President Joe Biden will be playing a lead role in coordinating the Barack Obama administration’s policies in Iraq, and Biden’s performance during the three-day visit he made to Iraq in the first days of July, raised some serious questions about whether Washington will be a helpful force as Iraqis continue their push for full independence and functioning self-governance.

The new U.S. ambassador to Baghdad, Christopher Hill, has scant experience of Iraqi history or politics, while Biden has for several years tried to follow Iraqi affairs closely from his seat on – and then as chair of – the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Biden’s voice in the intra-administration discussions of the months ahead is therefore likely to be a powerful one.

Inside Iraq, Biden is best known – and widely criticised – as a co-author of the 2006 "Biden-Gelb Plan", which urged that as much real power as possible be devolved from Iraq’s central government in Baghdad to three mini-states that would divide the country along ethnic and religious lines.

On Biden’s latest visit to Baghdad, his first as vice president, he was greeted by at least one sizeable anti-U.S. demonstration, in the Sadr City area of Baghdad. A McClatchy News reporter wrote that one demonstrator there said, "Biden’s visit sent the signal to us that Iraq will be divided. Biden’s background doesn’t allow him to play any role in reconciliation."

But playing a role in brokering intra-Iraqi reconciliation is exactly what Biden said he plans to do. He told reporters accompanying him on the trip that one of his goals was "to promote a political settlement on unresolved issues from boundary disputes to the oil law".

In a fully independent country, such matters are naturally the domain of the national government, rather than any outside power.

Biden also said that the way he planned to proceed was to "reestablish contact with each of the leaders among the Kurds and the Sunnis and the Shia and talk through with them what they think has to be accommodated" with regard to these issues.

His description of the main forces in Iraqi politics being the three ethno-religious groups of "Kurds, Sunnis and Shia", and the way he implied that each of these blocs is – or should be – monolithic revived fears among many Iraqis and Iraq experts that he is pursuing a "softer" and less territorialised version of his earlier power-devolution plan.

The experienced Norwegian analyst of Iraqi affairs Reidar Visser has noted that this new variant of the older Biden Plan already has a name that is widely used among Iraqis: muhasasa, or "apportionment".

Other Middle East specialists note that this looks suspiciously like the very inegalitarian system of "confessionalism" that the French bequeathed to Lebanon back in the 1940s, and that has been the source of considerable tensions inside Lebanon ever since.

Visser wrote in a recent commentary on his website, historiae.org, "What Biden and Obama don’t seem to understand is that most Iraqis detest this psychological sort of partition just as much as they hated the territorial variant that was advocated in the name of ethno-sectarian federalism in 2007."

He added that among most Iraqis, "Muhasasa is portrayed as a weakness of Iraqi politics which was introduced by returning Iraqi exiles and Paul Bremer in 2003, and which has since festered and grown into a fundamental problem that prevents professionalism and esprit de corps from taking root in the Iraqi state."

Visser noted that in the provincial elections that were held in Iraq in January, many new political forces emerged, weakening the hold of the big sectarian and ethnic parties on the levers of power at the local level.

The next nationwide elections are due next January. Visser worries that Biden and Pres. Obama might carry on talking as if "the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shia" make up the whole of the political spectrum, and might act in accordance with that view – as, for example, when Biden said he would deal primarily with the leaders of those blocs.

In that case, he wrote, the present, cross-sectarian movements and coalitions might well be crushed once again, as they were during the elections of 2005, and the political and programmatic differences that have emerged within some of the big ethno-sectarian blocs could easily be smothered.

Some Middle East experts said they thought Biden was also displaying a tin ear to the political sensitivities of most Iraqis when he warned that if Iraq’s politicians did not shape up and reach the political agreements he wants them to conclude, then the United States would have to lessen its involvement in Iraqi affairs.

"Why does he assume that after all the suffering they’ve been through in the past six years, most Iraqis want Americans to stick around?" one expert asked, in amazement.

She noted that while in Iraq, Biden seemed to talk only to a small section of the political elite, composed mainly of figures who had lived in exile under Saddam Hussein and rose to prominence in their country only under the patronage of the U.S. occupation.

"Of course, among those people, there is a high proportion who want the U.S. to stick around," she said. "Many of them fear that once the U.S. leaves completely they will have to leave too. And the past six years have been very profitable for many of those people, with all the contracts and influence they have won."

Under the terms of last November’s agreement, which was called a ‘Status of Forces Agreement’ (SOFA) by the Americans and a ‘Withdrawal Agreement’ by the Iraqis, the U.S. is obligated to withdraw all its troops from the rest of Iraq by the end of 2011.

Most Iraqis welcomed Washington’s near-full implementation of the first withdrawal step that it mandated, on Jun. 30. But they note that the U.S. still has combat troops inside some cities, including in Sadr City.

They also note that U.S. military "advisors" are still working with many nominally Iraqi military and paramilitary units, including the widely feared "Iraqi Special Operations Force" (ISOF), which has more than 4,500 US-trained members.

Journalist Shane Bauer recently asked the ISOF’s principal trainer, Brig. Gen. Simeon Trombitas, how long the U.S. military would remain involved with the ISOF. "We are going to have a working relationship for a while," Trombitas replied.

Disturbingly, he made no mention of the end-of-2011 deadline. So it looks as though the U.S. government plans to stay involved in Iraqi affairs, at many different levels, for quite some time to come.

*Helena Cobban is a veteran Middle East analyst and author. She blogs at www.JustWorldNews.org

IRAQ: Questions Remain About the U.S. Role – IPS ipsnews.net

WASHINGTON, Jul 6 (IPS) – Relations between Iraq’s various Kurdish, Arab and Turkoman ethnicities are going through a new round of complications since a provision in the draft constitution of the country’s northern Kurdistan region declared a range of disputed areas part of the historical Kurdish homeland, infuriating non-Kurds in the country.

All this comes against a backdrop of already high ethnic tensions and desperate U.S. attempts to stabilise Iraq as it prepares for a gradual withdrawal.

The controversial draft constitution passed in late June by Kurdish parliamentarians in the northern city of Irbil proclaims several key areas such as oil-rich Kirkuk, Khanaqin and districts around Mosul part of the "historical-geographical entity of Iraqi Kurdistan".

Out of 97 lawmakers present at the session, 96 voted in favour of the document. Officials have said they will soon put the charter to a popular referendum in the three provinces of Kurdistan. Despite some internal opposition, it is expected the voters will approve the draft.

The outrage among Arab and Turkomen political factions in the country came swiftly. Rejecting the provision in the Kurdish constitution "totally", Arab members of the Kirkuk provincial council called on national authorities and the "Iraqi people" to "intervene seriously so that everyone knows Kirkuk is a national Iraqi issue and no one can decide on it on their own for their political gains."

An ethnic flash-point, Kirkuk has witnessed a dramatic rise in violence over the last few weeks. Two bombs in Turkoman and Kurdish parts of the province left hundreds dead and injured signaling a clear determination by insurgent groups to exploit ethnic tensions.

Describing the Kurdish draft constitution as " in defiance of some of the articles" in the national constitution of Iraq, Mohammed Mehdi al-Bayati, a Turkomen deputy in the Iraqi parliament, told Aswat al-Iraq news agency that "the constitution the Kurdistan parliament passed is a negative message for the stability of Iraq".

Despite considering the disputed territories part of Kurdish soil, the draft constitution does not call for any forcible takeover of those areas and defers the matter to be settled through an article in Iraq’s constitution. Article 140 of the national constitution addresses longstanding territorial problems between Iraq’s Kurds and Arabs and lays down a road map to resolve the issue.

However, non-Kurds believe that the roadmap is devised in a way that will eventually give the control of those areas to Kurds. Disputed areas include large chunks of land scattered through Kirkuk, Nineveh, Diyala and Salahaddin provinces in northern Iraq.

Under former President Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi government expelled large numbers of Kurds and Turkomans from those areas in what is commonly referred to as "Arabisation". The strategic goal was to tilt the demographic balance in favour of the country’s Arab majority in those areas rich with natural resources like oil and gas.

Ironically, as Arab and Turkomen parties accuse Kurds of land-grabbing, critics in Kurdistan say the draft constitution does not take a clear position on the "Kurdish identity" of disputed territories, accusing Kurdish leaders of compromise and equivocation on the issue.

And while Arabs in Baghdad are increasing pressure to force Kurds to back down from their claims to disputed areas, Kurdish leaders appear to be more responsive to criticism from within Kurdistan.

"Kurdistan region’s president will not compromise on a span of Kurdistan’s territory," the office of Kurdish President Massoud Barzani said in a statement.

The Kurds’ dispute with other groups in the country is multi-faceted. One the one hand, it involves territorial rows with neighbouring Arab, both Shia and Sunni, and Turkomen populations. On the other hand, there are deep differences between the federal government in Baghdad and the Kurdish government over their respective powers on oil exploration and foreign policy, as well as territory.

In a bid to assert his authority and beef up his nationalistic credentials, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has taken a tough stance toward what he and many in Baghdad see as Kurdish expansionism and overly independent policies. While his Shia-led government has uneasy relations with Sunni Arabs, many allege Maliki is propping up Sunni Arabs in the north in their disputes with Kurds.

Although officially part of Iraq, the Kurdish government signs oil deals with international firms, establishes diplomatic relations with foreign countries, controls a 100,000 strong army and has forces in all disputed areas.

Kurdish leaders dismiss Baghdad’s criticisms, saying their moves are constitutional, and have threatened to secede from Iraq without those powers. In fact, elastic articles in the hastily-written national constitution have given both sides significant room to maneuvre and claim constitutional legitimacy.

With the gap between the views of Kurdish and Iraqi politicians widening, chances of another conflict in Iraq appear to be rising.

"They seem to be on a collision course and the only question is the severity of the collision… No one wants a collision but I can’t see a way to resolve this issue," Wayne White, an Iraq expert at the Middle East Institute, told IPS.

Any eruption of violence between Kurds and the Iraqi government will dash U.S. hopes for stability in a country already grappling with bloodshed and a paralysed economy. This has raised the question for many as to what role the U.S. can play to possibly forge a deal between Kurds and Arabs.

"I think because of the increased power of the central government, and the increased perception among Kurds that the U.S. is siding with Sunni Arabs and the central government, and the increased power of the KRG (Kurdistan Regional government), the U.S. is marginalised," said White, adding that there is a deep distrust between those sides. "The U.S. cannot do that much."

IRAQ: Is Another Conflict Inevitable? – IPS ipsnews.net

ISTANBUL, Mar 15 (IPS) – The Fifth World Water Forum begins in Istanbul Mar. 16 in the face of some stark facts: of the world’s water, 97.5 percent is the sea, and of the remaining, 70 percent is frozen in polar icecaps. That leaves precious little for 6.76 billion people around the world, expected to grow to 9 billion by 2050.

The statistics get scarier. United Nations agencies estimate that 1.1 billion people live without clean drinking water. About 70 percent of water is used for irrigation – and most of that is lost before it reaches the plant. In 2017 close to 70 percent of the global population will have problems accessing freshwater. In 2025, approximately 40 percent of the population will be living in water-scarce regions.

Confronting these facts, and the difficulties they raise, will be an estimated 20,000 participants who will attend the week-long forum on the future of the "commodity" that is so much more vital than oil or gas, gold or diamonds.

The parley will bring together cabinet ministers, mayors, management experts, academics, parliamentarians and civil society organisations to discuss a wide array of water-related issues, and come up with recommendations for action. The conference has been sponsored by the World Water Council based in Marseille (France) and Turkish government agencies along with the Istanbul municipality. The water forum is held every three years.

The theme for the forum this year is ‘Bridging Divides for Water’. It will address global changes and risk management, and the protection of water resources. The conference is expected to produce a joint declaration, The Istanbul Consensus.

What that consensus can be built around is another matter. "A global water crisis is on its way," says a paper prepared for the Forum by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the largest independent network working on natural resources, citing projected increases in population and pollution. Much of the concern boils down to a simple question: is water a "commodity" that profit-oriented private concerns can trade in, or a human right to be guaranteed by public institutions? Who owns it? Who should manage it?

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RAMALLAH, Feb 23 (IPS) – At the eleventh hour, just as a permanent ceasefire painfully mediated by the Egyptians after weeks of intensive shuttle diplomacy was about to take effect, Israel suddenly changed its preconditions for a settlement with Hamas.

This has left the Palestinians, especially Gazans, the Egyptians, the Hamas leadership and even some Israeli analysts wondering just what will happen next. The humanitarian crisis in Gaza remains unresolved and the current tentative ceasefire looks increasingly fragile as intermittent violence continues.

IPS spoke to Dr Ahmed Yousef, the Gaza-based Hamas Foreign Minister and political advisor to Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh about the stalemate.

IPS: What is your understanding of how the ceasefire should have come into effect?

Ahmed Yousef: It is not only our understanding but also that of the Egyptians, the Israelis prior to their about-face, and the Europeans. After weeks of tough bargaining it was agreed with the Israelis that there would be two stages of negotiations.

The first stage would involve the permanent opening of some of Gaza’s borders and the implementation of a permanent ceasefire. The second stage would revolve around a prisoner swap and the opening of the other border crossings. The Israelis had previously agreed to this.

IPS: What are Israel’s new demands and when did you become aware of these?

AY: Over the weekend we were informed through the Egyptians that Gaza’s border crossings would remain sealed until the captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was released. We were also informed that a significantly altered prisoner exchange would have to take place first before any border crossings would open or any ceasefire would be agreed to.

IPS: Why do you think the Israelis suddenly changed the preconditions for a permanent ceasefire?

AY: I believe it has a lot to do with the Israeli elections. The Israeli Prime Minister would like the release of Shalit to be part of his legacy before he steps down in light of the corruption scandal that has clouded his premiership.

It is also likely that incoming prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu wants the matter resolved before he takes office. He doesn’t want to be seen as weak by having negotiated with us. Israel’s sharp swing to the right in the recent elections has also emboldened the Israeli government to be more tough.

IPS: What is Hamas’s standpoint in regard to Israel’s new preconditions?

AY: We will not tolerate Israeli blackmail. Israel believes it is in a position of strength following the Gaza war and that it can dictate terms to us but they are mistaken. We will stand our ground and wait until the Egyptians, other regional leaders and the international community pressure Israel.

Let them be the arbiters of who has reneged on the agreement. Even the Egyptians who normally side with Israel believe the Israelis are responsible for the breakdown in negotiations. Additionally some Israelis are blaming their own government for the state of affairs.

Several senior Israeli intelligence leaders have described the Israeli cabinet’s unanimous decision to link any permanent ceasefire with the release of Shalit as problematic. They also stated that Israel hadn’t shown any signs of the steps it would take to ensure the release of Shalit.

IPS: One of Israel’s new conditions is a change to the list of prisoners who it is prepared to release. Israel has said it will not release some of the prisoners, whom it accuses of murdering Israeli civilians, on your list. Are you prepared to renegotiate the list?

AY: Let’s first be clear that Shalit was no innocent captive. He was an Israeli soldier who aimed and shot his weapon, and probably other armaments, at Palestinian civilians. Furthermore, Israel has imprisoned over 10,000 Palestinian prisoners, many without trial, and many of whom were abducted from their homes at night. They have also been subjected to torture.

I also think if we look at Israel’s recent military assault on Gaza and which side has the blood of more civilians on its hands, it will be apparent that Israel is in no position to pontificate about morality. The world saw what Israel did to Gaza’s civilians.

And no, we will not change our list of prisoners whom we want released in exchange for Shalit.

IPS: You are speaking in fairly tough manner. Can Hamas afford to be so inflexible given Israel’s enormous power both militarily and diplomatically?

AY: Contrary to Israel’s wishes, Hamas has not been weakened. While our infrastructure has been badly destroyed and we have paid a high price in regard to the loss of civilians, we still control Gaza and we are still respected by Gazans.

Furthermore, according to recent opinion polls we have also become more popular in the West Bank, while the popularity of Palestinian Authority (PA) leader Mahmoud Abbas, who controls the West Bank, has decreased dramatically.

IPS: How long do you think it could take before there is some kind of political breakthrough?

AY: This I don’t know. Whether it will take weeks or months nobody can say. What I can say, however, is that our patience does have its limits. Israel’s continued closure of the borders is an act of war and we therefore reserve the right to take action in response to this.

IPS: Are you saying that Hamas will start firing rockets again at Israel?

AY: As I’ve just stated we reserve the right to respond to the military attacks that Israel is carrying out against Gaza as well as the continued blockade of the strip which is in itself an act of aggression.

IPS: What do you expect the international community to do?

AY: We believe the international community has a vital role to play and actually the ball is in their court. The humanitarian situation in Gaza is terrible and the world is aware of this. I don’t believe regional, European and even American leaders will stand for the humanitarian situation to deteriorate even further. They are all aware who suddenly changed the rules of the game and they are all responsible for pressuring Israel to live up to its end of the deal.

The alternative is renewed violence and suffering on an even larger scale, something that nobody wants to even contemplate.

IPS: Do you believe that Hamas has itself done all it can to come to some sort of accommodation with Israel?

AY: We had previously offered Israel a long-term Tadhiya or permanent ceasefire of 20 years. We also twice offered to accept Israel’s existence within the internationally recognised 1967 borders in return for Israel granting Palestinians their rights. Israel ignored these offers.

We also enforced the recent six-month ceasefire to the best of our ability until Israel launched its cross-border military raid into Gaza on November 4.

The PA in the West Bank has bent over backwards to accommodate Israel and the Israelis continue to build new settlements there.

What more do you want us to do?

Source: Q&A: ‘Hamas Won’t Give In To Blackmail’ *

BAGHDAD, Feb 21 (IPS) – Seventy percent of Iraq’s doctors are reported to have fled the war-torn country in the face of death threats and kidnappings. Those who remain live in fear, often in conditions close to house arrest.

"I was threatened I would be killed because I was working for the Iraqi government at the Medical City," Dr. Thana Hekmaytar told IPS. Baghdad Medical City is the largest medical complex in the country.

Dr. Hekmaytar, a head and neck surgeon, has now been practising at the Saint Raphael Hospital in Baghdad for the last five years.

It is difficult now both as woman and as doctor, she says. Most women are now living in repressive conditions because the government is less secular. And that is besides the chaotic conditions around Iraq.

"It is particularly difficult for female doctors," Dr. Hekmaytar says. "Large groups in Iraq only want us to stay at home, and certainly not be professionals."

"We’ve had doctors kidnapped, and so many others have fled," said Khaleb, a senior manager at the hospital who requested that his last name not be used. He named several doctors who had been kidnapped. This IPS correspondent, he said, was the first media person allowed into the hospital since the U.S. invasion of March 2003.

Doctors and other professionals become targets for kidnapping since they earn more money than most, and so fetch higher ransom.

"I’ve had to ask for security to protect the hospital," Khaleb said. "After this, I went to Amman and convinced many of our doctors there to return. They did, but now they live in the hospital and never go outside. This has been the case since 2005. Every two months they leave to go visit their families in Jordan."

Saint Raphael is a 35-bed hospital, but sees more than a thousand patients daily, says Khaleb. "Of our specialist doctors, ten live here full time. In addition, we have three younger doctors living here full time."

Large concrete blocks restrict entry to the street leading up to the hospital. Iraqi army personnel guard the front door. Everyone entering the hospital is searched.

The hospital is located in the Karrada area of Baghdad, just across the Tigris river from the Green Zone. The neighbourhood is relatively safe by Baghdad standards, although attacks and car bombings still take place.

The hospital is on a side street close to several apartment buildings and private homes. Unlike most government hospitals it is clean and well stocked.

Dr. Hekmaytar is one of the doctors Khaleb persuaded to return to Baghdad. "Of course nobody likes to leave her home country, I was so sad," she said. "I am grateful to be back, but wish it wasn’t under these difficult circumstances."

Sitting with several doctors outside an operating room, she told IPS that death threats have never gone away.

"This is common here even now, but was especially so during 2004," she said, as other doctors nodded in agreement. "Now I live and work in the hospital, and never leave."

Dr. Hekmaytar, a Christian, received death threats twice. One came by way of a note in an envelope telling her to convert to Islam, or else. The second time she received a note in an envelope instructing her to where hijab. The note was enclosed with a bullet.

Dr. Shakir Mahmood Al-Robaie, an anaesthetist, too lives on the premises of the hospital where he works. "I both live and work here because I was threatened," he told IPS. "My family is in Jordan."

The doctor said his family received an envelope containing just a single bullet. After this, he moved his family to Jordan, and then returned to Iraq to get an income for himself and his family.

"Common? These threats are not just common," said Dr. Jafir Hasily, a surgeon sitting across from Dr. Hekhaytar. "They are routine. This happens all the time."

The Iraqi government estimates there were 36,000 doctors and medical personnel in Iraq when the U.S. invasion was launched in March 2003. Most escaped to neighbouring Arab countries, especially Jordan and Syria.

In early 2008, the Iraqi Health Ministry said that 628 medical personnel have been killed since 2003. Many believe the real figure is far higher, and that there is additionally a very large number of doctors who have been kidnapped and tortured.

In the absence of the doctors who left, particularly of senior doctors, the medical system is on the brink of collapse. It is short not just of doctors but also of other qualified staff, equipment and drugs. Patients are often forced to buy their own medicines on the black market.

The security situation that led to the exodus of doctors is now somewhat better, but remains unstable. (END/2009)

IRAQ: Doctors in Hiding Treat as They Can

BAGHDAD, Feb. 18 (Xinhua) — Continuous U.S. military presence hidden or under light after combat troops pull-out has recently justified their stay in Iraq, at least in part to a near-monopoly arms deal between Washington and Baghdad that worth more than five billion U.S. dollars.

The U.S. military announced on Saturday it has struck deals with Iraq that will see Baghdad spend five billion dollars on American-made weapons, equipment and training.

In what was regarded as one of the biggest rearmament programs ever seen in the region, Iraq is to receive from the U.S. 140 M1 Abrams tanks, six C130J Hercules transport aircraft, 24 armed Scout helicopters, and unspecified numbers of F16 fighters, anti-tank missiles and light aircraft.

Washington has also agreed Baghdad to boost their fleet by purchasing a group of vessels and ships, including four 450-ton patrol ships from Italy.

The Iraqi Security Forces have already received approximately 1.5 billion dollars in services, vehicles, aircraft parts, small arms, uniforms, and training, and have made commitments for purchases additional 3.5 billion dollars, according to U.S. Army Lt. Col. Kimberly Enderle, chief of transportation logistics and accountability for the Security Assistance Office.

Thanks to the Gulf War and the following invasion on Iraq in 1991 and 2003 respectively, Washington single-handedly destroyed what used to be the first military power in the Middle East, but instead now strives to rearm Iraqi army, navy and air force with amazingly amount and sophisticated weapons in just less than a decade.

Such a dramatic and high profile change in policy implies Washington’s strategic considerations as well as military ambition in the war-torn country at the very heart of Middle East.

TROOPS WITHDRAW

During the transition from Coalition to Iraqi-led operations, as a statement released in Baghdad on Saturday said, the Iraqi government has taken tremendous steps to rebuild and strengthen the Iraqi Security Forces and bolster the nation’s self-sufficiency in support of the Security Agreement between Iraq and the United States.

According to the new Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) sighed just a month before George W. Bush stepped down, U.S. combat troops will leave Iraqi towns and cities in the middle of this year, and must all leave Iraq no later than 2011.

To the new Obama administration, how soon the fledgling Iraqi government is able to subdue the insurgency once U.S. troops leave is high on the agenda. Yet, the status quo remains somewhat in doubt.

Immediately following generally peaceful regional elections last month, Iraq witnessed sporadic and widespread explosions and attacks surge against civilians, with the one last week the most brutal, which claims more than a hundred innocent lives.

Despite Iraqi Security Forces have taken much of their responsibilities during the past year, the speed withdrawal is obviously too slow for this six-year-trapped U.S. army which is to eagerly be redeployed to Afghanistan.

The Iraqi Army is still wrestling with the country’s restive insurgency. However, heavy casualties in operations against countless roadside bombs, car bombs and suicide attackers underline an insufficiency of military equipment.

The army that Saddam Hussein created to shore up his regime was destroyed after the Gulf War in 1991 and the Iraq War in 2003. Hundreds of T72 and T55 tanks have turned to rust and both the navy and air forces have been destroyed.

Therefore, as politicians from both sides agreed to further stabilize security situations in Iraq and a consequent U.S. troop withdrawal, two tank battalions with Abrams and ten artillery batteries with 120 mm light guns will be provided this year.

The air force is to get F16 fighters by 2015 and the navy is awaiting the arrival in June of the first of four 450-ton Italian patrol ships.

MILITARY DETERRENT

Among the military supplies Washington promised this time, items like M1 Abrams tanks, armed Scout helicopters, F16 fighters and anti-tank missiles are obviously way too much for the proclaimed purpose of counter-insurgency in Iraq.

Though demands of Apache attack helicopters from Iraqi side were turned down, Washington instead provided scout helicopters armed with anti-tank missiles and other sophisticated arms observers believe for U.S. "imagined rivals" with strong armed forces, indicating countries surrounding Iraq, with Shiite dominant Iran in particular.

U.S. has repeatedly blamed Iran for assisting insurgency in neighboring Iraq by providing weapons, funds and training, which Iran has strongly denied.

After a hasty U.S. troop withdraw, a fragile Iraqi armed forces would barely able to stave off Iranian infiltration, and the mostly Shiite south of Iraq, including the oil rich Basra could fall prey to its powerful Shiite neighbor.

Washington believes a strong Iraqi military revival after U.S. left is an efficient balance of power in the Middle East, which secures U.S. interests in the region.

Diplomatic relations between the Persian state and the world’s most super power are sensitive since the United States cannot tolerate Iranians obtaining nuclear technologies.

Like what U.S. imposed on most of its adversaries, Iran also fell victim of severe U.S.-led trade embargoes and financial sanctions, which deadlocked bilateral nuclear talks.

With a large amount of sophisticated military equipment supply whose standards are qualified for a conventional war, Washington is comfortable with renewed Iraqi military forces that would balance geopolitical landscape.

In this regard, despite Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki reiterated U.S. could not attack neighboring countries from its territory, a strong military presence under U.S. control is vital once war between U.S. and Iran broke out.

PERMANENT PRESENCE

The outgoing U.S. ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker once said, despite tangible progress, "the development of this new Iraq is going to be a very long time in the making, and we need to be engaged here."

In fact, during the process of training Iraqi forces, huge amount of U.S. military personnel dubbed as advisors, mentors and experts would finally remain in Iraq even beyond the troop pull-out deadline in 2011.

According to reports from the Inter Press Service News Agency (IPS), U.S. generals had hoped to sell Obama on a plan that they formulated in the final months of the Bush administration, aiming to re-categorize large numbers of combat troops as support troops so as to maintain their presence in Iraq.

The ambitious arms sale to Iraq this time is no strange to the U.S., as what Washington did in 1970s to Iran and its all-time policy to Israel. Through arming its regional alliances, U.S. reaped not only lucrative profits, but also guided the whole Middle East to follow U.S. interests and ideology.

The timing and conditions Washington chooses, however, coincides with Iraq’s needs.

"It seems that circumstances are ripe enough for the U.S. authorities in Iraq to exert its first serious attempt to build an Iraqi Army," Najib al-Alawani, a teacher in Baghdad University told Xinhua.

"The awaited army will always need U.S. weapons, equipment and training, and that would provide a permanent need for U.S. military backup," he added.

Salih al-Shiekh, a professor in Baghdad University also eyes a bigger Iraqi role in the Middle East.

"I believe that the current Iraqi army is a little more than a militia and less than a real army, but now after the Americans guarantee their partial presence in Iraq after they signed the SOFA agreement, they will allow us to build an army," he said.

"It also shows that Iraq will take a greater role in the region, but not to replace Israel, I may say alongside with Israel," he added.

Editor: Mu Xuequan

Source: News Analysis: Washington’s five-billion-dollar ambition in Iraq_English_Xinhua  by Fu Yiming, Gao Shan