Gorilla’s Guides

The unexpected Iraqi resistance to the U.S. demands reflected the underlying influence of Iran on the al-Maliki government as well as Sadr’s recognition that he could achieve his goal of liberating Iraq from U.S. occupation through political-diplomatic means rather than through military pressures.

WASHINGTON, Jul 10 (IPS) - Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s demand for a timetable for complete U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq, confirmed Tuesday by his national security adviser Mowaffak al-Rubaie, has signaled the almost certain defeat of the George W. Bush administration’s aim of establishing a long-term military presence in the country.

The official Iraqi demand for U.S. withdrawal confirms what was becoming increasingly clear in recent months — that the Iraqi regime has decided to shed its military dependence on the United States.

The two strongly pro-Iranian Shiite factions supporting the regime in Baghdad, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and al-Maliki’s own Dawa Party, were under strong pressure from both Iran and their own Shiite population and from Shiite clerics, including Ayatollah Ali Sistani, to demand U.S. withdrawal.

The statement by al-Rubaei came immediately after he had met with Sistani, thus confirming earlier reports that Sistani was opposed to any continuing U.S. military presence.

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The two massive bomb explosions in Western Mosul in January of this killed more than two hundreds, wounded many others, and literally destroyed communities. It should have been a warning to the green zone government headed by Nouri al-Maliki and indeed since then the GZG has not ceased talking about how determined it is to launch a “surge” in to defeat al-Qaeda in Ninawa.

Thus far the “Mosul Surge” has not materialised.

What the GZG did instead was to launch the “Basrah surge” codenamed “The Charge of the Knights”. Maliki attached so much importance to this assault on his main rival for power that he, his security adviser, and the GZG defense and interior ministers, went to Basrah, and Maliki personally took charge of the operation. Faced with the killing of his trusted confidant and personal security adviser, and the singularly unpleasant shock of the dismal performance of his troops, many of whom promptly went over to the Jaish al-Mahdi, against an entrenched and well-led Mahdi Army, Maliki was forced to take the politically costly step of calling in the British and American invaders to take direct part in the fighting.

Maliki and the GZG were thus fully occupied with the southern and central governments at a time when a massive campaign of bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations was wreaking havoc in Mosul and it’s hinterland. This infuriated the governor who has not ceased to vociferously condemn Maliki, his Dawa party, his political allies the SIIC, and the Kurdish bloc, for incompetence and neglect of the security of Mosul, Irak’s third largest and strategically vital city.

The Anbar Model Will Not Work

Maliki, al-Hakim, Barzani, and their American invader allies had hoped, foolishly, that as in al-Anbar a tribal movement would emerge as a base upon which to build a security force possessed both of local knowledge and the determination to use it. This was never likely. The circumstances that obtained in al-Anbar most certainly do not obtain eithr in Mosul or in the governorate as a whole:

Mosul is far more ethnically diverse that al-Anbar possessing as it does substantial populations of:

• Kurds
• Fayli
• Turkmen
• Christians
• Shabaki,
• Assyrians

Such diversity ruled out the possibility of engineering a Sunni stability axis. Moreover the results of the refusal of the Sunni Arabs in the governorate to join the American sponsored “security forces” have engendered many sources of lasting bitterness, particularly towards the Kurds and their Peshmerga. Having refused to to betray Irak by allying themselves with the hated Americans the Sunni leadership in the governorate political and tribal alike found themselves facing both military and political disasters.

• A campaign of systematic and frequently brutal ethnic cleansing the Peshmerga loyal to the KDP [Editors’ Note: headed by Massoud Barzani.]

  ( The KDP has frequently tried to deny that they have imported Peshmerga forces into the governorate claiming instead that the local GZG security forces are Kurds indigenous to the governorate. Given the accents of many of these “local” Kurds this defies belief.)

• A concerted effort by the KDP reportedly ordered by Massoud Barzani to severely reduce, if not entirely eliminate, their access to political influence.
• The assassination campaign waged against them not only by al-Qaeda surrogates such as the IAI but also by sections of the legitimate Iraki resistance.

It’s Not Just The Arabs Who Are Bitter

The bitterness of the Sunni Arab tribes is mirrored by bitterness from the other groups in the governorate all of whom accuse them of shielding armed groups such as the IAI who have mounted an intense ethnic cleansing campaign and numerous suicide bombings. Non-Muslim groups such as the Yazhidi and Christians have been particularly targeted in this campaign. Both Fayli and Turkmen have also been subjected to what can only be described as a vicious campaign of extermination. In the case of the Turkmen the area around Tal Afar has seen many attacks and many deaths in the last twelve months for which, with good reason, they blame both Sunni Arabs and the Peshmerga.

All of these groups have set up protective militias to counteract the extermination campaigns being waged against them.

Assassinations Of Former Armed Forces Members

There are two assassination campaigns being waged against former members of the armed forces. The first is relatively sporadic and appears to be being waged by Peshmerga. The second is more organised, given that this campaign is being waged primarily against former Air Force Officers, given that many of the victims fought as pilots in the war against Iran, and given that several of the victims have been kidnapped and severely tortured both by burning with heated irons and the use of electric drills it is more than highly likely that there are at least three Badr Brigade death squads operating in the city and its environs.

The Coming “Surge”

The complexity of the situation outlined briefly above make it clear that the Americans and their GZG underlings will not be able to co-opt any one group to act as a security and stabilisation force. Several indicators lead me to believe that Maliki is nevertheless determined to press ahead with a “surge” in Mosul:

• Politically he has no choice but to press ahead with a “surge” both because of his own actions and the pressure upon him from SIIC and the Americans.

  The strident tone of his remarks and statements following his meeting with the American Secretary of State in late April. [Editor’s note: April 20th 2008. ] He stressed repeatedly that he was in the process of launching a security campaign and that the campaign would be the conclusive battle against “al-Qaeda.”

• The arrival of reinforcement Peshmerga forces over a period of weeks.
• The arrival of other GZG forces.
• The arrival of Sahwa fighters.

  This last development appears to be related to the efforts of the leaders of the Sahwa to establish themselves as a political party (see our report: مؤتمر صحوة العراق يبدي استعداده لارسال افواج لدعم القوات الامنية )

  Both [name withheld] and [name withheld] are of the opinion that this particular move is not approved of by the Sahwa movement leadership in general and is largely a “freelance” effort by a particular faction. My own enquiries amongst relatives in al-Anbar active in Sahwa leadership circles produced contradictory results. Enquiries by [name withheld] produced similarly opaque results.

Local Factors

There is no doubt that any effective operation tending to reduce the impact of al-Qaeda inspired and/or affiliated groups in Mosul and it’s hinterlands would receive some public support. In tribal circles those voices who wish to regain their influence by organising along the lines of the Anbar model are calling for a security plan to be implemented. Not coincidentally these are the same people who are trying to organise a local “awakening”. For the reasons outlined above these are unlikely to be enough. Moreover the various armed groups in Mosul have been busy entrenching themselves. Dislodging them would require massive bombing by the attacking forces followed by fierce street battles in which areas would likely need to be cleared house by house. These and looking to the resumption of the bombing campaigns in Diyalah and Baghdad lead me to believe that any battle of Mosul will be both hard and unlikely to be over quickly.