The man they were waiting for was a 32-year-old Jordanian doctor called Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi.

He was driving across the border from Pakistan where he had spent a year becoming close to Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s Egyptian deputy. That morning, Wednesday December 30, Balawi had been picked up at the Ghulam Khan border crossing by an Afghan army commander called Arghawan, who was in charge of security at the Chapman base. The pair drove to the village of Mermandi, near Khost in south-eastern Afghanistan, where at about 12.30pm they were met by Arghawan’s driver.

…  …  …

As Balawi stepped out of the car, seven CIA officers and a handful of soldiers gathered around. According to the guard, it was then that Balawi detonated his bomb, killing eight and injuring six.

Arghawan, still sitting in the driver’s seat, survived the initial blast but a US soldier shot him in the head with his pistol, assuming that he was part of the bomb plot.

“There were lots of body parts,” said the guard. “The suicide bomber’s legs were all that was left of him. He had hidden the bomb beneath his pattu.”

Source:  How this suicide bomber opened a new front in Al-Qaeda’s war – Times Online [emphasis added].

If you want a perfect example of how the American military loses wars it’s sitting there staring you in the face. In that one throwaway sentence giving one little detail in a relatively lengthy report sits the perfect example of how unreasoning American military brutality is busily engaged in losing the war in Afghanistan, gaining America and Americans lots more enemies, and losing America and Americans allies. It’s worth repeating — "Arghawan, still sitting in the driver’s seat, survived the initial blast but a US soldier shot him in the head with his pistol, assuming that he was part of the bomb plot."

Arghawan

If you read the Times’ report in full you’ll learn that:

1. Arghawan was "an Afghan army commander" who was "in charge of security" at the FOB¹ Chapman.
2. He was of sufficient rank to command the services of a driver.
3. That the CIA commander in the base trusted him enough for him to be told that he was to meet al-Balawi and bring him to the base a week ahead of time (from Ghulam Khan border crossing to FOB Chapman is about a 2 hour drive).
4. That he knew al-Balawi and trusted him.
5. That he was known to al-Balawi who trusted him in return.
6. That he possessed sufficient tradecraft to take at least one anti-surveillance measure that we know of.

Being only a humble bomb disposal officer with several successful tours of duty both in Irak and in Afghanistan under my belt I make no claims to being an expert either in military intelligence nor do I claim to be anything other than reasonably well informed on Afghanistan. Nevertheless a big part of my job is ensuring the survival of the men under my command by not unessarily brutalising or offending the locals and being able to recognise patterns in a seemingly chaotic environment. A side-benefit of having being promoted is that I have had some military intelligence and counter-intelligence training. I have always been reasonably proficient at activity analysis.

Having issued all the required disclaimers and caveats I will say that I’ll eat my beret, epaulettes, ribbons and boots if, given 1-5 above, Arghawan was "just" an Afghan army commander. I’d drop dead with shock if Arghawan was just an "Afghan army commander". The evidence above leads me to strongly suspect that Arghawan was at the very least a middle-ranking officer in the Afghan intelligence service — the Amaniyat.²

Not Your Average Grunt

So what have we got?

We’ve got a US soldier acting as a guard in the inner ring of a secured CIA operated FOB in one of the trickier to deal with provinces of Afghanistan.

Now this US soldier wouldn’t be just an average grunt. Not with that posting. He’d be an experienced soldier and almost certainly would have at least some counter-intelligence and counterinsurgency training. It is also almost certain that in the unlikely event of him not being a special forces soldier that he would at the very least have had some fairly intensive special forces training.

In short neither this soldier nor his comrades in FOB Chapman would be "average grunts". They’d be both experienced and well-trained and expected to behave as well-trained experienced professionals in a crisis.

Assault, Treachery & Criminally Stupid Incompetence

What cirumstances do we have?

A fortress (which is what an FOB is) can be penetrated by the enemy either by assault, treachery, or both. In this case the fortress was penetrated by treachery and subjected to a devastatingly successful attack. The "US soldier" was understandably upset. And (being understandably upset) he responded in the unthinkingly violent manner known and despised by America’s enemies and allies alike the world over. He assumed that Arghawan who had somehow survived the blast³  was part of the plot and "shot him in the head with his pistol".

Even if the US Soldier’s assumption was correct and Arghawan was party to the conspiracy it was an act of criminal stupidity to kill him. There are lots of reasons why shooting Arghawan dead was an act of of criminally stupid incompetence. I’ve listed some of them below, they’re not in any particular order, doubtless you can think of others.

Let’s assume Arghawan was part of the plot to penetrate the base:

• Killing him meant that there was no possiblilty of interrogating him. There is therefore no possibility of finding out why he didn’t search al-Balawi.
• The opportunity to glean intelligence information from Arghawan about the bomber’s last hours is gone.
• There is no possibility of finding out from him whether, like al-Balawi, he was in fact an operative for the Taliban.
• If he was an operative for the Taliban there is now no possibility of finding out:
  • Who turned him and how.
  • There is now no possibility of finding out whether his service was penetrated by the Taliban and if so the extent of penetration
  • There is now no possibility of finding out who his contacts were.
  • There is now no possibility of discovering who his controller was.
  • There is now no possibility of discovering how he eluded discovery.
• It’s a war crime to kill the wounded.
• It’s a war crime to kill the enemy without giving them the chance to surrender.

Let’s assume Arghawan was NOT part of the plot to penetrate the base:

• It’s a bad idea to kill your allies just because your massive security and operational failings have resulted in disaster.
• The opportunity to glean intelligence information from Arghawan about the bomber’s last hours is gone.
• Arghawan’s comrades are unlikely to be pleased with this further display of how little their lives are valued by Americans.
• It’s a war crime to kill the wounded.
• It’s a war crime to kill suspects without giving them the chance to surrender.

I remember once seeing on late-night television the 1958 film  "I Accuse!" about the  Dreyfus Affair. In it there’s a sequence in which Dreyfus is publicly disgraced as being unfit to bear arms for his country. He is paraded in front of his comrades and other soldiers and has to stand still while another officer rips off the buttons and epaulettes from his uniform, confiscates his sword and breaks it over his knee.

I hope they do a lot more than that to this soldier whose unthinking need for revenge meant that he committed a war crime and threw away vital intelligence information. I hope they court-martial him first for being a war criminal and then court-martial him again being criminally stupid and incompetent. I hope that they parade him in front of his regiment and publicly chop his fucking balls off pour encourager les autres.

du

IEDs have proved the Taliban’s most deadly weapon: three out of five coalition troops killed last year in Afghanistan were victims of the bombs. At least 48 of the 108 British fatalities were caused by IEDs.

Chris Hunter, a former bomb disposal expert who served in Iraq and now runs his own consultancy said the new weapons were being manufactured from wood in Pakistan.

"The expertise for this new generation of bombs is likely to be coming from foreign fighters from places such as Chechnya," he said. "But they are being mass produced in Pakistan and are being wheeled out on an industrial level. You see them everywhere."

Earlier in the war, IEDs would be mostly triggered by two hack-saw blades separated using a spacer. When the blades were stepped on or driven over they would complete an electronic circuit which so detonated the explosive – often an artillery shell.

Mr Hunter added that the metal saw blades have now also been replaced with graphite blades and the artillery shells with ammonium nitrate. The damage is caused by the power of the blast rather than metal fragments, or shrapnel.

The number of IEDs used in Afghanistan has increased by 400 per cent since 2007 and the number of troops killed by them by 400 per cent, and those wounded by 700 per cent according to a report by a US group called Homeland Security Market Research.

One brigade commander posted to Afghanistan said that sniffer dogs were the most reliable way of detecting IEDs, but this method took a long time and required a lot of animals. Already convoys have to move at very slow speeds while roads ahead are checked for explosives.

He added his troops were becoming "IED-shy", because of the stress levels created by this new generation of weapons.

Taliban make ‘undetectable’ bombs out of wood | The Independent

"During the period of investigations, we present ourselves as employees of a local NGO and offer some food and clothes. After we get their trust, we make our offer that varies according to what we have found out. If the family is really poor they can accept very low deals but sometimes with more literate ones, prices are higher.”

• At least 150 children a year sold for £200 to £4,000
• Some bartered youngsters become sex abuse victims

Report from: Afif Sarhan in Baghdad The Guardian, Monday 6 April 2009

Corruption, weak law enforcement and porous borders are compounding a growing child trafficking crisis in Iraq, according to officials and aid agencies, with scores of children abducted each year and sold internally or abroad.

Criminal gangs are profiting from the cheap cost of buying infants and the bureaucratic muddle that makes it relatively easy to move them overseas. Accurate figures are difficult to obtain because there is no centralised counting procedure, but aid agencies and police say they believe numbers have increased by a third since 2005 to at least 150 children a year.

One senior police officer said at least 15 Iraqi children were sold every month, some overseas, some internally, some for adoption, some for sexual abuse. Officials believe at least 12 gangs are operating in Iraq, offering between £200 and £4,000 per child, depending on its background and health. The main countries in which they are sold are Jordan, Turkey, Syria and some European countries including Switzerland, Ireland, the UK, Portugal and Sweden.

According to Colonel Firaz Abdallah, part of the investigation department of the Iraqi police, gangs use intermediaries who pretend to be working for non-governmental organisations. During negotiations with the families, members of the trafficking gangs prepare the paperwork: birth certificates, change of names and the addition of the child to the passport of the intermediary or any other person who is paid to take the child outside, usually to Syria and Jordan and from there, to Europe or other Middle East countries.

"The corruption in many departments of the government makes our job complicated [because] when those children come to the airport or the border, everything looks correct and it is hard for us to keep them inside the country without significant evidence that the child is being trafficked," Abdallah said.

"A couple of weeks ago we caught a couple with a six-month-old baby leaving by car from the Iraqi border to Jordan. One of our police officers found the age difference between the couple strange and asked our office to check. After arresting them we found out that the girl was sold by her parents and was going to be taken to Amman, then after that, to Ireland where a family had already paid for the baby."

One dealer, who asked to be called Abu Hamizi, said child trafficking from Iraq was cheaper and easier than elsewhere, given the readiness of underpaid government employees to help with the falsification of documents.

"Before we try to negotiate with any family we study their living conditions, their debts, the goods they own, and when we feel that the relatives are suffering with unemployment and cannot feed their children, we make our approach that in most of the time is welcomed as we are seen as aid workers," he said.

"During the period of investigations, we present ourselves as employees of a local NGO and offer some food and clothes. After we get their trust, we make our offer that varies according to what we have found out. If the family is really poor they can accept very low deals but sometimes with more literate ones, prices are higher.

"We prefer babies but sometimes families request children from one to four years old but they are rare cases."

The traffickers said they would check up occasionally to ensure the child was doing well. But Abu Hamizi said he once heard from a colleague that one of babies sold last year was used for organ transplants in the Middle East.

Though Abu Hamizi insists that "client" families were well-treated, a 2007 report by the NGO Heartland Alliance found that traffickers employed the threat or use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or vulnerability, or giving payments or benefits to a person in control of the victim.

Sarah Taminn, 38, a widow and mother of five from Babel, said she had already sold children aged four and two in the past year. She had no regrets despite receiving less money than promised by the dealer.

"People might see me as a monster but if they know how hard it is to live in a displacement camp, without a job, support or husband, they might change their idea," she said. "I did anything possible to keep them with me but I lost my husband while I was pregnant with my fifth child and life became too hard. I love all my children. I know that the families who adopted them will give a good life, food and education that I would never give."

Aid workers say very little is being done to overcome the problem. "Reports of trafficking are increasing because people are much more aware now and they feel confident enough to talk about this child rights violation," said Fatuma Ibrahim, chief child protection officer of Unicef from the Iraq Support Centre in Amman. "Of course, Unicef is very concerned about these reports and we are working with the Ministry of Labour and Social Services to follow up on reports of alleged ‘adoptions’."

Aid agencies are warning parents that many children are used as sexual workers or sold to paedophiles. "We tried to approach many of these families to alert them about what can happen with their kids but we have been threatened and two aid workers were killed after they tried to prevent a child negotiation," said one aid worker, Ahmed Sami.

Source: Iraqi babies for sale: people trafficking crisis grows as gangs exploit poor families and corrupt system by Afif Sarhan in Baghdad The Guardian

A few months into my training we went to the U.K. to train against some of our British counterparts (we won). I’d arranged a short leave both to attend some of the events at the book festival in Hay-On-Wye and to both bankrupt myself and rick my back as a result of visiting some of the town’s bookshops. In one of these I came across the foxed and severely battered remains of both books of the Barrack Room Ballads. Ahhhh ……… much was now explained. This was originally a song! And a drinking song at that! How could I have missed it? It’s not as if there weren’t plenty of clues. First there is not only the repetition of the refrain itself but also the pattern of the refrain:

• Serve, serve, serve as a soldier,
• Fit, fit, fit for a soldier . . .
• Bad, bad, bad for the soldier . . .

And so on …

Then there’s the way he treats the first syllable in the third, fourth, and fifth lines of each refrain, and the capitalisation of “OF” to reflect to an extended note, or beat. To say nothing of its somewhat grim humour – of the kind we military types enjoy. Ah so it’s a drinking song.

Men selvfølgelig!!!

I knew about those! Kipling wrote this as a drinking song for use in the enlisted mens’ mess. Its purpose was the same as the drinking songs that I and my fellow cadets sang. — A sort of informal tutorial, a tool for creating camaraderie amongst those who sang it, a reminder to veterans, a celebration of the bonds inherent to the life, life, life, of being soldiers OF the Queen. What could be more obvious? How on earth had I missed it? No wonder dad likes it so much.

But it’s the last verse that I want to talk about. The last verse addresses the the ferocity of Afghan resistance to foreign rule a ferocity which, as I can testify, is no less today than it was in Kipling’s time. They might, and often do, hate each other, but they hate foreigners coming in slaughtering their civilians and then lying about it even more. They not only hate the foreigners who have come and are trying to violently take over their country, they hate them so much that the last lines constitute good advice:

When you’re wounded and left on Afghanistan’s plains,
And the women come out to cut up what remains,
Jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains
An’ go to your Gawd like a soldier.

One of the things I learnt during my tours of duty is that the Pashtun people live, and fight, and die, by their honour code — by Pashtunwali.

Pashtunwali which means “the way of the Pashtuns,” is the sine qua non of Pashtun identity. A Pashtun who adheres to Pashtunwali possesses honour (izzat). A Pashtun who for whatever reason no longer possesses honour is no longer considered to be a Pashtun. A Pashtun who is no longer considered to be a Pashtun has no entitlement whatsoever to:

• Rights.
• Protection.
• Support of the Pashtun community.

Pashtunwali’s honour-based society is governed by several key concepts:

• Chivalry (bravery/courage) — nang – also known as ghayrat.
• Hospitality — melmastia.
• Sex boundaries — purdah or namus.
• Council (jirga).

One of the other things I learnt is that most of the people with whom I dealt considered that under the Taliban the circumstances in which it would be possible to live by this honour code are achievable, and that they are not achievable under any foreign-sponsored regime. They are not particularly for example interested that what they see as a miniscule minority of women in Kabul or the other cities may no longer go to university. They are very interested in their daughter getting through adolesence without being raped by some western-supported warlord’s levies.

Now there’s an interesting thing about Pashtunwali, and it’s how the concepts interact and reinforce one another. Let us consider, for example the duty to offer protection to your guests against all comers. Let us imagine that you have a guest. Let us further imagine that this guest has first helped you defeat an invasion by a hated atheist interloper. Let us imagine moreover that this guest has used his own money to benefit your population by building roads. Clearly the man is not only a guest but an honoured guest. Let us stretch our imaginations yet further and say that this guest is accused of a heinous crime, a crime involving the deaths of nearly three thousand people in a foreign land, and that officials from this foreign land (called “America”) arrive demanding that you turn your guest over to them.

What is the honourable course of action for you to take? Under Pashtunwali the accuser must show proof before you can hand your guest over. The Taliban asked for proof. I have never either heard or read anywhere that the State Department furnished proof. I have read and heard that once the Taliban asked for proof that far from providing it the American visitors became both abusive and threatening.
Now there is an interesting thing about Pashtunwali, which is that if someone comes to you saying that your guest is guilty of a crime but refuses to provide evidence to back up their accusation resorting to threats of annihilation instead then you gain honour by refusing to hand him over (even if he is guilty). The more fearsome the threats the greater the amount of honour you incur.
If you suspect that that means that when America threatened the Taliban that their stock soared you’d be right.

I have never, not even once, been able to get any American enlisted man, gunny, officer, to understand that very basic reason why Mullah Omar, refused to give Bin Laden up.

So here we are well into the “honeymoon” phase of the new American administration, and the fiercely pro-American UK Telegraph is reporting a cool response to Gates’ request for more NATO troops to match the 17,000 troops that President Obama has sent keep Afghanistan from Afghanistan: Slipping out of control, what I would find even more alarmingly if I were in the Obama admnistration is that people of the stature of Michael Burleigh are writing things like this in the fiercely pro-American Telegraph:

But the second view is voiced less often – except by generals in private. That is because a depressing uniformity of outlook prevails among politicians in the two major parties, namely that a critical view of what is happening in Afghanistan might undermine the western alliance. Our young soldiers are being killed just to show willing in Washington, doubly so now that a popular Obama has replaced Bush.

History bulks large in what the critics have to say, namely that Afghanistan has always proved to be a graveyard for foreign interlopers. They are in sympathy with Kipling’s "Jest roll out your rifle and blow out your brains / An’ go to your Gawd like a soldier" when you lie wounded on the Afghan plains. Meanwhile, Nato and the US have not succeeded in eliminating al-Qaeda (in north-west Pakistan), only in turning the Taliban into the spearhead of an Afghan nationalist insurgency. Paradoxically, the Taliban have become the solution to the lawless chaos they create, as they were before 9/11.

It is impossible to build a central government in a country where local leaders resent all outsiders, and whence anyone of any ability has fled. With an abundance of opium, rather than oil, there is little prospect of creating an Afghan national army equivalent to that now patrolling Iraq. Hence further confusion. Is it the West’s task to engage in drug eradication – without giving Afghan farmers any alternative – let alone to reverse the religious Reformations the Islamists represent?

The failure to have a wide-ranging debate about Afghanistan and to reach any mutual conclusions has meant the policy drift of the past six years and the strategic confusion today.

Source: Do British troops die in Afghanistan to show willing in Washington? – Telegraph

What is the answer in Afghanistan? Well for a start “know your enemy” has always been good advice otherwise we might as well jest roll to our rifles and blow out our brains — it will be cheaper and less painful in the long run. 

du

Notes and resources:

• I have copied below the entirety of Kiplings poem for those For those who would like to read it.
• In December 2006, The Economist published a pretty good article on Pashtunwali Pushtunwali – The Pushtuns’ tribal code a copy of which can be found at the Happy Arab’s site.
• A good research source for information on Afghanistan is the National Defense University’s Merlin system for Afghanistan.
• Aghanistan Library Collections
  • Arthur Paul Anderson Afghanistan Collection at University of Nebraska-Omaha
  • Afghanistan Centre at Kabul University
  • Afghanistan Digital Library (New York University)
  • Afghanistan Digital Library (University of Arizona)
  • Simon Fraser University’s Afghanistan Conflict Monitor gives a good sample of coverage from various sources of Afghanistan.
  • The UK NewsNow service covering Afghanistan is invaluable.

d

السلاح الشخصي، قبل أكثر من أربع سنوات، كان يعني للعراقي علامة من علامات السلطة والنفوذ، و محاولة جعل مقبض المسدس ظاهرا للعيان كانت تعني ان حامله يتمتع بتفويض من سلطة أمنية عليا. وبعد سقوط النظام السابق بات حمل السلاح شائعا، كحمل القلم، أو نظارة القراءة، أو سلسلة المفاتيح. ويقول (جاسم،ح) وهو ضابط في الشرطة برتبة رائد، أن "الذين لا يحملون سلاحا تحت ثيابهم اليوم هم قطعا يحتفظون به في منازلهم" . مشيرا على أنه وحسب تقديرات وزارة الداخلية في زمن الحكومة الانتقالية الثانية؛ فإن العراقيين يحتفظون في بيوتهم بحدود خمسة ملايين قطعة سلاح، وهو ما يسمح به القانون دون حاجة إلى إجازة من الحكومة على عكس ما كان عليه الحال سابقا حيث يتطلب حمله رخصة من الحكومة. 
وفي قسم الأمانات في معاهد وكليات الموصل تجد أسلحة تعود لطلاب وطالبات وأساتذة وضعوها في صناديق مقفلة، أو أودعوها عند موظف الاستعلامات ليعودوا ويأخذوها بعد انتهاء حصتهم الدرسية، وفي المحافظات الأخرى تبدو هذه الظاهرة أكثر انتشارا حتى داخل المدرجات وصفوف الطلاب.
ويقول (صادق. ع) وهو تاجر أسلحة خفيفة لم يبلغ الثلاثين بعد ينحصر نشاط عمله في منطقة باب سنجار أن الطلب على السلاح زاد بشكل ملحوظ مع بداية عام 2006 وهو في تصاعد مستمر وان أسعار السلاح في ارتفاع أيضا حيث يبلغ سعر مسدس ( برونك ـ 9 ملم ) الآن حدود ( 1000 ـ 1200 $ ) بعد ان كان في السابق بحدود( 700 $ ) أما مسدس ( طارق ـ 7 ملم و 9 ملم ) العراقي الصنع فان القطعة الجيدة منه تصل إلى سعر ( 1500 $ ) بعد ان كانت في حدود ( 800 $ ) العام الماضي.
ويقول ياسين وهو طالب جامعي من سكنه حي الوحدة أن "حمل السلاح أباح للشباب اكتساب الخبرة في التعامل مع أنواع مختلفة من الأسلحة، والقدرة على بناء أمنهم شخصي" مشيرا إلى أن "اتساع عمليات الاغتيالات والخطف هي عامل هام في عملية اللجوء إلى حمل السلاح ،حيث لا يمكن للمتاجر والمحلات في مدينة الموصل أن تخلو أبدا من قطعة سلاح".
أسلحة للسيدات:
وفي إحدى الصيدليات بالقرب من بيت ياسين يخفي الصيدلاني ( ن. ر ) مسدسا نوع ( ستار ) تحت أكياس القطن في صيدليته، وآخر نوع ( سميث ) في درج منضدته ويقول انه تعرض إلى سطو مسلح لمرتين.
ويعد مسدس ( كلوك ـ 9 ملم ) هو الأكثر بريقا؛ فهو السلاح الخاص بالأجهزة الأمنية العراقية، وهو مرغوب جدا لدى العصابات المنظمة فحمله يعطي الانطباع بان العملية منفذة من قبل الشرطة السرية ويصل سعره الى ( 1200 $ ) في الظروف الاعتيادية والى ( 1500 $ ) في الأزمات الأمنية.
ويقول تاجر السلاح ( ف. ط ) الذي يسكن حي الزهور في الموصل انه باع مسدسات من نوع ( ستار ) و ( كلوك ) بالتقسيط لمراهقين دون سن ( 18 ) وتحدث عن وجود ساحة في منطقة القادسية تستخدم كموقع رماية، يؤجر فيها البعض مسدساتهم، وان مراهقين يجربون إطلاق المسدسات بسعر قدره دولار واحد لكل إطلاقة مسدس.
وتقوم خلود التي تعمل موظفة امن في دائرة حكومية بالموصل بتفتيش النساء. وهي تقول لـ (نقاش) ان السيدات يفضلن حمل مسدسات صغيرة عيار( 5 ملم ) في حقائبهن وان هذه الظاهرة لم تكن موجودة قبل عام 2006. وتعتبر أن "ثمة مهن تفرض على النساء حمل السلاح منها المحاماة والطب" وأن أختها سوسن وهي طبيبة أسنان كانت قد اشترت مسدسين نوع ( برونك ) خشية من عصابات النهب التي تستهدف الأطباء وقد سلحت حارس عيادتها بـالأول من عيار ( 9 ملم ) واحتفظت هي بالآخر ( 7 ملم )، وان زوجها دربها على الرماية على سطح بيتها حيث تطلق النار ليلا مستهدفة عبوات الببسي كولا من الحجم العائلي.
مهن جديدة:
ويقول التاجر ( صادق،ع ) أن " أغلب أنواع السلاح تأتي مهربه من سوريا وإيران أما مسدس ( كلوك ) فمصدره الأجهزة الأمنية حيث تم ضخ كميات كبيرة منه الى السوق عند استيلاء المسلحين على مراكز الشرطة في مدينة الموصل في شهر رمضان من عام 2005".
وتكاد تجارة الأسلحة تكون علنية في الموصل خاصة الخفيفة منها، ففي كل حي تقريبا يوجد شخص يثمن الأسلحة ويتاجر بها ويقايض سلاحا بآخر، وهؤلاء يمكن لهم عقد صفقات كبيرة مع المسلحين وعصابات الخطف والسرقة.
و هناك من الأشخاص من برع في أمور صيانة الأسلحة التي تدر على صاحبها دخلا لا بأس به، وهم يتوقعون ازدهارا باهرا لهذه المهنة طالما مدينة الموصل حسب التوقعات مرشحة لمزيد من التوتر الأمني.
ويفضل مبتدع فكرة التقسيط في الموصل ( ف. ط ) التعامل مع الشباب في تجارته حيث أنهم "يرغبون دائما في اقتناء الأفضل" وهو يحرص دائما على الحصول على قطع سلاح قديمة من أنواع لم تعد مستخدمة على نطاق واسع اليوم مثل ( ميكاروف) و(لاما) و(دايموند ) وهي مخصصة للشباب "ذوي الدخل المحدود" ويصل سعر القطعة منها ( 400 $ ).
ولا تقوم القوات الامنية العراقية والأمريكية بمصادرة السلاح البيتي، وتتيح للمواطن العراقي ان يحتفظ بقطعة سلاح واحدة من باب الدفاع عن النفس، وفي المقابل تشهد المدينة حوداث قتل وإصابة عديدة ليس مردها فقط الوضع الأمني المضطرب وعصابات القتل والإجرام، بل أيضا اقبال الشباب المتزايد على اقتناء الأسلحة وتجريها والعبث بها، حيث العديد منهم الآن على استعداد تام لإطلاق النار. نقاش –

عادل كمال – الموصل

جريدة حوارات الالكترونية… تقارير عراقية

• 10 Fatalities throughout KRG.
• More than 7,000 case of acute watery diarrhoea.
• Estimated 2.8 Million people living in the affected areas.

Twelve districts of Northern Iraq have reported laboratory-confirmed cases of cholera putting over 2.8 million people exposed to public health risk from this current outbreak. Five out of eleven districts of Sulaymaniyah province, all five districts of Kirkuk province and two out of seven districts of Erbil province are now affected by this cholera outbreak in Northern Iraq.

Sulaymaniyah

The cumulative number of cases of acute watery diarrhoea reported from five out of eleven districts stands at 48401 including 9 deaths with an overall case fatality rate of 0.18%. In Sulaymaniyah province, Vibrio cholerae has been laboratory confirmed in 315 stool specimens out of 1,629 specimens (19%) collected so far.

Kirkuk:

The health authority of Kirkuk province reported a total of 3,728 cases of acute diarrhoeal disease including 1 death (CFR: 0.026%). The first index case of cholera, confirmed by laboratory test, was reported from Kirkuk province on 14 August 2007. So far, from the Kirkuk province, a total of 291 stool specimens out of 5,610 samples collected so far have tested positive for Vibrio cholerae. Out of these, 116 stool specimens out of 3,207 samples (4%) collected tested positive in the month of August and 175 stool specimens out of 2,403 stool specimens (7%) tested positive in the first week of September so far.

Erbril:

On 6th of September, the first laboratory-confirmed case of cholera was reported for the first time from one of the  districts (Erbil centre) of Erbil province. Later on, laboratory confirmed case was also reported from Koisnjaq district. So far 21 stool specimens from these two districts of Erbil province have tested positive for Vibrio cholerae serogroup 01 Inaba signifying that cholera has now spread to three provinces of Northern Iraq (Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk and Erbil). Consolidated figure on cumulative number of cases of acute watery diarrhea since the first index case of Vibrio cholerae was laboratory confirmed are still not available.

Actions Taken/Bodies Involved:

The International Committee of the Red Cross, Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders), and United Nations agencies including UNICEF and the U.N. Development Programme have joined WHO efforts to respond to the cholera epidemic.

All public water systems in the affected areas have been chlorinated, and samples are being regularly collected and tested to ensure potable water standards are being met.

(Note: Many in the affected areas rely on well water according to our sources.)

URGENT NEEDS

While surveillance system for acute watery diarrhea/cholera is showing signs of improvement in general, there is an urgent need to improve it further in order to obtain better quality data for continuous risk assessment and assess  the effectiveness of the control measures real time. In order to strengthen the surveillance system for acute watery diarrhea/cholera in the affected districts of Northern Iraq, two international qualified epidemiologists needs to be deployed temporarily (One in Sulaymaniyah province and the other in Kirkuk province) to assist the local health authority in improving surveillance, conducting case investigation, imparting training to the rapid response team members for outbreak verification etc.

In terms of medical and laboratory supplies, the current need is to expedite the shipment of 10 Inter Agency
Diarrhoeal Disease Kits to Erbil and 5000 rapid diagnostic kits (SMART kits) to Northern Iraq

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