Gorilla’s Guides

British Intelligence Made Deal With Mahdi Army

Secret deal kept British Army out of battle for Basra - Times Online:

A secret deal between Britain and the notorious al-Mahdi militia prevented British Forces from coming to the aid of their US and Iraqi allies for nearly a week during the battle for Basra this year, The Times has learnt.

Read in full: Secret deal kept British Army out of battle for Basra - Times Online

Six days on the sidelines left Britain facing wrath of allies in Basra - Times Online:

Details of the “accommodation” between British intelligence officers and elements of al-Mahdi Army, which has been blamed for murders and other atrocities in Basra for the past four years, shocked US and Iraqi officers, who have expressed a sense of betrayal. All parties involved agree that Britain’s reputation in Iraq has been badly, possibly irrevocably, damaged by the episode.

The Charge of the Knights, as the operation was called, got off to a shaky start as Iraqi police and soldiers – trained by the British but lacking much experience – met fierce resistance from the Shia militiamen, threatening a humiliating early defeat for the Iraqi leader.

Demoralised and outgunned, some 3,000 men surrendered their weapons and fled, their vehicles left burning in the street. Mr al-Maliki, who flew down to Basra to take command of the operation, knew that the outcome would probably decide his fate as well.

Read in full: Six days on the sidelines left Britain facing wrath of allies in Basra - Times Online

‘This was a bad time for Army. But the city is now safer’ - Times Online:

Worse still was the small print of the deal fixed between the British military and leaders in Basra of the Shia al-Mahdi Army – supporters of the fiery cleric Moqtada al-Sadr – under which it was agreed that Britain’s military would stay out of the city and remain encamped at its base at the airport.

When Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi Prime Minister, found out about the “accommodation” he was said to be furious. His anger led six months later to the surprise decision to send 30,000 Iraqi troops, backed by more than 900 American Marines and US Apache attack helicopters, into Basra on March 25 in Operation Charge of the Knights to take on the Shia extremists – ignoring the 4,000-strong British contingent at the Basra airfield.

General David Petraeus, the US Commander of the multinational force in Iraq, made it clear after the withdrawal of the 500 British troops from Basra palace last September that he had given his blessing to the pullout. Hinting at the deal with the militia, he acknowledged the wisdom of the British approach to counter-insurgency – that “you reconcile with your enemies, not with your friends”.

However, the accommodation with the militia meant that even the SAS was unable to operate inside Basra for fear of breaching the deal. Despite the diplomatic tact shown by General Petraeus, US commanders lower down the chain of command became disillusioned with the way that the British were operating in the south.

Read in full: ‘This was a bad time for Army. But the city is now safer’ - Times Online

Update

British commanders wanted to storm Basra but the Iraqi leader sent for US Marines - Times Online:

British and Iraqi commanders in Basra had their own troop-surge plan to rid the city of Shia militia extremists but it was vetoed by the Iraqi Prime Minister, the Ministry of Defence has confirmed.

The third and final phase of the plan, which would have involved a surge of Iraqi troops into Basra with “low-profile” support from British troops, was due to have started this month. When it was presented to Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi Prime Minister, on March 21, however, he surprised the British by announcing that he had his own troop-surge plan that he would launch the following day, with 900 American soldiers and Marines being sent into Basra.

Colonel Robert Castellvi, the senior American Marine adviser to the 1st Iraqi Army Division sent down to Basra, described exclusively to The Times what he found when he arrived in the southern city in March. “The Iraqi forces that had been in the city had been defeated. There were whole swaths of the city under militia control,” he said. “The provincial government had stopped functioning as a government that provides security for the people. There were dead bodies and burnt-out vehicles on the streets.”

The rejection of the longer-term plan drawn up by General Mohan al-Firaiji, then the Iraqi commander in Basra, in collaboration with the British military, was the latest blow in relations between Mr al-Maliki and the British commanders in the south.

Read in full: British commanders wanted to storm Basra but the Iraqi leader sent for US Marines - Times Online: