Uprooted and Unstable: Meeting Urgent Humanitarian Needs in Iraq
Uprooted and Unstable: Meeting Urgent Humanitarian Needs in Iraq describes a vacuum of humanitarian assistance created by the failure of the Iraqi government and the international community to administer aid to civilians. During a mission inside Iraq, researchers for Refugees International found that Iraqi militias are creating a Hezbollah-like dynamic by becoming major humanitarian providers of food, clothing, oil and other basic resources. As a result, militias are recruiting civilians, including displaced Iraqis, at a rapid pace.
Refugees International cautions that failure to address this problem will have dire consequences for the humanitarian and security situation in Iraq. The report recommends that aid organizations, including the UN, navigate the complex landscape by partnering with local groups inside Iraq, and discourages refugee returns until more effective aid channels are established.
Selected Extracts From The Report:
Shiite and Sunni Militias: Filling the Assistance Gap
Refugees International visited an office of the Sadr movement in the Ur district of Baghdad. The office provided locals with clothing, milk, oil, rice, sugar, clothes and fuel for heating and cooking when supplies are available. The central government does not play any role in that area. Locals even come to the Sadr office for the adjudication of legal disputes.
The office also provides stipends to displaced families and the families of slain or imprisoned Mahdi Army men.
Sunni militias play a similar role with displaced and other needy Sunnis. They too settle the displaced in homes that belonged to Shiites. There is less organized help for Sunnis, but the Islamic Party — the main Sunni political Party in the Government — is an important service provider, distributing food and non-food items, providing medical relief and supporting local NGOs. Sunni militias also handle the distribution of key items such as heating gas. As Sunnis in Baghdad get virtually no electricity or other services from the government, they rely on local militias and warlords to secure their areas and manage what services they can obtain.
The Government of Iraq: A Sectarian Approach to Assistance
The Government of Iraq is itself a party to the conflict and its security forces have facilitated displacement and sometimes carried it out themselves. Officers in the Iraqi Security forces complain that most of their men are loyal to the Mahdi Army and most of their commanders are loyal to the Mahdi Army or the Badr Militia. They and Sunni groups described incidents where Iraqi Security Forces opened fire on Sunni neighborhoods, protected death squads, or were directly involved in the kidnapping and execution of Sunni civilians.
Instability and the Threat of New Violence
The sustainability of the lull in violence that occurred in late 2007 is being questioned, especially in light of the March 2008 events in Basra, Sadr City and other areas of Iraq where Shiite militias battled each other. The temporary reduction of violence in 2007 was a combination of many factors. Muqtada al Sadr’s “freeze,” or ceasefire, on his powerful militia in August 2007 coincided with a Sunni militia ceasefire of sorts. Sunni militiamen began to cooperate with the American army against Al-Qaeda, because they were tired of fighting US forces with little results, afraid of losing control of all of Baghdad and desirous to counter Al-Qaeda’s reign of terror.
Like the Mahdi army, these Sunni militias also have political goals and are attempting to unite to become a larger movement that will be able to regain Sunni territory and effectively fight the Shiite militias and the Shiite dominated government, which they call an “Iranian Occupation.” In some ways their attitude is, “The Americans did not buy us, we bought them.”
Militiamen on both sides are chafing under the restrictions placed on them and growing increasingly frustrated. Conversations with individuals involved in the issue lead Refugees International and others to worry that absent a real political reconciliation process and an efficient disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program, these groups will remain as armed militias with the same political agenda and strong grievances. In the very violent Diyala and Mosul governorates, this strategy of the US -backed Sunni militias has so far not succeeded.
The Reasons for Returns
According to a UN official, the Bush Administration is also putting enormous pressure on UN HCR to conduct a viability survey and declare Iraq safe for returns. Most international actors believe that Syria and Jordan, as well as the US , want Iraqis to return to their country as soon as possible to avoid any potential instability likely to be caused by a protracted crisis.
Obstacles to Return
Besides the fragility of the security situation, there are many other obstacles to return. According to assessments conducted by international and national aid agencies, refugees and IDPs who have returned need shelter, electricity, water, employment and non-food items. Humanitarian organizations have recently designed programs to target those needs. For instance, IOM designed a returnee food and non-food basket, and seeks to assist returning families by including them in its community assistance, water/sanitation, health and education programs
Despite this mobilization by the international community, the systems are currently not in place to handle a large number of returnees.
Since then, the Government of Iraq has taken some steps to respond to these concerns, but they have yet to be implemented and are insufficient.
Property Disputes
There is no unified process to deal with returning internally displaced persons or refugees. In particular, there is no body officially handling property disputes. As in the post-conflict Balkans, property disputes are likely to be a key issue in Iraq, and have already started surfacing, as many returnees were unable to go home since their houses are occupied by others. Property disputes will linger for many years to come and if not handled properly are likely to be a spark for renewed violence. For now, there is no judicial entity mandated with dealing with post-2003 property disputes. Instead, they are being handled on an ad-hoc basis, by a variety of actors.
Iraqis who have property claims dating after April 2003 have no other recourse today than to turn to the severely deficient Iraqi judicial system or local armed groups. The current situation in Iraq remains too violent to design and implement a large-scale effort to compensate and provide restitution to those who have lost their homes.
[Editor’s Note: see also : Gorilla’s Guides » 2nd May 2007, 03:27 pm » Displaced families fall victim to house sale scams ]
Conclusion:
The needs of the displaced, the returnees and Iraqi civilians in general continue to increase, as conflict has been affecting them for years now. The Government of Iraq is as fragmented as the country, and unable and unwilling to provide adequate assistance to those in need, offering a golden opportunity for various armed groups to fill the gap.
Source: Refugees International | Uprooted and Unstable [PDF] The executive summary to the full report is below the fold.
See also posts on these related topics: Ethnic Cleansing, IDPs (Internal Refugees), Refugees.
Executive Summary
Five years after the US -led invasion, Iraq remains a deeply violent and divided society. Faced with one of the largest displacement and humanitarian crises in the world, Iraqi civilians are in urgent need of assistance. Particularly vulnerable are the 2.7 million internally displaced Iraqis who have fled their homes for safer locations inside Iraq. Unable to access their food rations and often unemployed, they live in squalid conditions, have run out of resources and find it extremely difficult to access essential services. The US , the government of Iraq and the international community must begin to address the consequences of leaving Iraqis’ humanitarian needs unmet.
As a result of the vacuum created by the failure of both the Iraqi Government and the international community to act in a timely and adequate manner, non-state actors play a major role in providing assistance to vulnerable Iraqis. Militias of all denominations are improving their local base of support by providing social services in the neighborhoods and towns they control. Through a “Hezbollah-like” scheme, the Shiite Sadrist movement has established itself as the main service provider in the country. Similarly, other Shiite and Sunni groups are gaining ground and support through the delivery of food, oil, electricity, clothes and money to the civilians living in their fiefdoms. Not only do these militias now have a quasi-monopoly in the large-scale provision of assistance in Iraq, they are also recruiting an increasing number of civilians to their militias - including displaced Iraqis.
Since the beginning of the crisis, the Government of Iraq has proven to be unwilling and unable to respond to the needs of vulnerable Iraqis. Although it has access to large sums of money, it is divided along sectarian lines, lacking both the capacity and the political will to use its important resources to address humanitarian needs. As a result, the government does not have any credibility left with Iraqis. The little assistance provided by the government is perceived by most as being biased in favor of the Shiite population, especially when it comes to the delivery of government services such as electricity or food ration cards from the Public Distribution System.
The international community has been largely in denial over the disastrous humanitarian situation in Iraq, and has until recently seen Iraq through the prism of reconstruction and development, and failed to address urgent needs. Only recently has the United Nations issued a common humanitarian appeal for Iraq, recognizing the nature of the situation and the need for all agencies to step up and address humanitarian needs. Hindered by its political mandate in Iraq, and its lack of access to most of the country, the UN has no other choice than to rely on local partners to reach out to the communities most in need. By taking advantage of the “balkanization” of Iraq to identify interlocutors who can facilitate access throughout the country, the UN can create a larger space to meet humanitarian needs. Identifying and supporting local, non-governmental organizations that are known and trusted by the communities they serve will also be essential if the UN is to take a more important role in humanitarian assistance inside Iraq.
Ongoing violence in Diyala and Mosul, as well as recent events in Basra and Baghdad, have proven that the situation in Iraq is still too unstable and violent for people to return home. Of those Iraqis who have returned from Syria, most were unable to go back to their homes, as they would likely be attacked again, and had to move into homogenous, sectarian areas. Others found their homes occupied, and were unable to recover them.
While everyone hopes that Iraqi refugees and internally displaced people will be able to return to their homes in the future, the necessary conditions for returns to take place in safety and in dignity do not exist. All relevant actors should discourage returns until the violence subsides and people can receive adequate assistance and protection. In particular, the Government of Iraq should no longer use returns as an indicator of success in stabilizing the country. Returns — like the rest of the humanitarian situation — should not be used as a political tool by any of the parties to the conflict.
It is also difficult for people to return home because they have minimal access to basic services and the Government of Iraq does not have a clear strategy to handle returns. Moreover, property disputes are already emerging, as many houses of people who previously fled are now occupied by others who will be reluctant to give them up. Disputes are currently settled in an ad hoc manner, by a variety of actors such as the Iraqi army, the Iraqi police, or the militia in control of the neighborhood. For any return movement to be sustainable, the Iraqi Government, with the support and expertise of the international community, must devise a strategy to deal with property disputes, in a larger transitional justice framework. In the meantime, the Iraqi Government must ensure that property rights — and their violations — are documented.
Current Iraqi and American strategies for responding to Iraqi displacement assume that security will improve steadily over the next two years. However, the situation in Iraq remains volatile, and the Government of Iraq, the UN , the US government and other members of the international community must develop plans for Iraq based on all possible scenarios, including a deterioration of the security situation. Negotiations must begin with regional and local governments to ensure that people will be allowed to seek asylum in both Iraq and in the region in case violence increases and displacement resumes in large numbers. For Iraq to have any future, international donors must ensure that resources are allocated to the humanitarian response, and that all appeals are fully funded. As for the UN , it needs to develop its network of local actors, and reach out to all vulnerable Iraqis - whether or not they are displaced.
Failure to address the needs of Iraqis will have dramatic impacts on security inside Iraq. The hope that does exist lies in the efforts of Iraq’s citizens. Iraqi organizations are providing lifesaving assistance throughout the country and the international community must increase efforts to reach out to these groups and provide them with the funds to continue their work. Ultimately, only Iraqis can save Iraq.
Source: Refugees International | Uprooted and Unstable [PDF]
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