The Mahdi Army Freeze - Between The Hammer of A Commitment and The Anvil Of Harassment
I perceive that it is necessary to include a condition that cancels the freeze decision in case the U.S. army or Iraqi security forces commit an act of aggression against us, especially if it is an unprovoked attack. We should hold our weapons against those who carry weapons to commit aggression against us; otherwise, we would be a target for them, as happened during the first term of the freeze decision.
Editor’s Note: The Arabic language posting of this feature by the independent Iraki newsagency Aswat Al Iraq (Voices of Iraq) is here Gorillasguides.com تجميد جيش المهدي بين مطرقة الالتزام وسندان المضايقات Aswat Al Iraq published their English language version under the title; “Freezing Mahdi Army, issue of power and power of issue.” I have somewhat freely translated the Arabic Title to give a better sense of the article.
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Baghdad, Feb. 27, (VOI) – The decision made by the Shiite leader, Muqtada Al-Sadr, to extend the freeze on his Mahdi Army’s militia’s activities, for a period of six months that initially began on February 26, 2008, was welcomed by the Iraqi government and the different players on the political arena in Iraq. Within the Sadr Trend itself however, and particularly its armed wing, the Mahdi Army, there are different stances in this respect, ranging from the necessity to abide orders, and fears of becoming easily-captured targets.
At the time that Lewaa Semaisim, head of the political committee of the Sadr Trend, revealed that there will be further compelling orders for Mahdi Army’s performance, some leaders of the militia showed different point of views regarding the decision to freeze their activity. Debates covered the expected outcome of the extension, and the possibility of becoming simple targets, but all those leaders agree that they are committed to obeying the extension order of Mahdi Army’s freeze.
“Sayid Muqtada al-Sadr will embrace a number of new mechanisms to organize the activities of Mahdi Army, after he issued the decision to freeze their activity,” Semaisim said to Aswat al-Iraq – Voices of Iraq – (VOI), explaining that the first freeze period has been evaluated, and decisions have been made accordingly, refusing to expose any further details concerning the new mechanisms.
When the current Iraqi cabinet was formed on May 20, 2006, the Sadr Trend held six ministerial posts out of the 37-member cabinet, but in April 2007, the Trend withdrew its ministers demanding that Premier Nouri Al-Maliki replace them with “independent, honest, and qualified technocrats;” however, the Sadr Trend is still considered a powerful political entity, as it occupies 30 out of the 275 seats of the Iraqi parliament landscape.
The Sadr Trend joined the election of December 15, 2005, as part of the Shiite United Iraqi Coalition (UIC), but in July 2007, the Trend became a separate entity in the Iraqi parliament, after accusing other allies at the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC – headed by Sayid Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim), and Dawa Party (headed by Iraqi Prime Minister – Nouri Al-Maliki) of making decisions without first consulting UIC members.
Nassar Al-Robaee, head of the parliamentary Sadrist bloc, denied that the Sadr Trend used the freezing of the Mahdi Army as a trump to press for more political achievements that will pave the way for the Trend to join the new cabinet. “The Sadrist bloc didn’t employ the issue of freezing Mahdi Army as an approach to join the cabinet, gain political accomplishments, or even to impose pressures on the government; we will never act like this,” Al-Robaee told VOI. He continued “The first freeze decision came with no conditions, and coincided with the Sadr Trend’s resignation from Maliki’s current cabinet,” describing the freeze decision as “historical,” stressing that the freeze order is not subjected to any political compromises.
In addition to the active political arm in the Iraqi parliament, the Sadr Trend has a military wing, Mahdi Army (Jaishal-Mahdi) that consists of armed groups of Sadr Trend followers. In July 2003, Shiite leader, Sayid Muqtada al-Sadr, announced that he formed the Mahdi Army as a “peaceful force” and social movement.
Due to some accusations against some elements, supposed to be members of Mahdi Army, young Shiite cleric, Sayid Muqtada Al-Sadr, issued an order in late August 2007 obliging personnel of the Mahdi Army, which belongs to the Sadr Trend, to freeze all armed activities for six months so as to identify “and eliminate rotten elements,” according to a release that was issued at that time.
When the first freeze period of the Mahdi Army was coming to an end, expectations arose that Mahdi Army may resume its former activities, especially considering Mahdi Army leaders and members’ references to “campaigns that target them,” but Shiite leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, extended the decision to freeze the Mahdi Army for another six months starting on February 26, 2008.
One of the leaders of the Mahdi Army expressed his surprise with the extension, due to the repeated aggressive acts against “Mahdi Army fighters.” Despite his expectations that the freeze decision was going to end, he emphasized that he is committed to obeying the extension order as it is. “We expected that Sayid Muqtada al-Sadr would end the freeze decision, due to the attacks against us that have been conducted by U.S. army and some Iraqi security forces, during the first freeze period,” Abu Yasser told VOI, proceeding, “we are practically bound by the decision of Sayid Muqtada al-Sadr, and we will not respond to any attack, but others should also not attack us.”
Abu Yasser demanded that the freeze order be cancelled in case “aggression” would be directed against Sadr Trend followers. “I perceive that it is necessary to include a condition that cancels the freeze decision in case the U.S. army or Iraqi security forces commit an act of aggression against us, especially if it is an unprovoked attack,” Abu Yassir said, explaining “we should hold our weapons against those who carry weapons to commit aggression against us; otherwise, we would be a target for them, as happened during the first term of the freeze decision.”
Another leader of Mahdi Army, referred to as “Abu Israa,” sees the freeze order as a “temporary necessity to protect Sadr Trend followers,” Abu Israa said to VOI. “Many of the violent acts and attacks have been carried out under the name of Mahdi Army, and we have absolutely no relation with all this, and the freeze decision aims to prove this point,” he continued. “It is necessary to reconsider the categories that joined the Trend during the freeze order, and to adopt orders of Sayid Muqtada al-Sadr as a criterion to obtain a future work plan.”
According to the organizational structure of Mahdi Army, the commander of each company is called “Khadimal-Sariya” (Servant of the company). As one of those commanders or servants, Abu Arkan fears that some parties may exploit the freeze decision to conduct a process of “settling accounts,” according to Abu Arkan’s description, who demanded that the “freeze of Mahdi Army should comply with a political consensus to ensure that other political entities cannot use it to eliminate the Mahdi Army,” Abu Arkan said to VOI, asserting “we will abide by the orders of Sayid Muqtada al-Sadr as long as others are not rallying against us.”
Indexed under: Aswat Al Iraq Features, Badr Brigade, Features, Jaish al-Mahdi, Jaish al-Mahdi temporary ceasefire, Mahdi Army, Sadrist Bloc, Sadrist leaders - detention campaign by GZG/Badr, SIIC (Formerly SCIRI), SIIC (SCIRI)